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MAKING DO IN MAKING DRUGS:
INNOVATION POLICY AND
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING
W. NICHOLSON PRICE II *
Abstract: Despite increasing recalls, contamination events, and shortages, drug
companies continue to rely on outdated manufacturing plants and processes. Drug
manufacturing’s inefficiency and lack of innovation stand in stark contrast to drug
discovery, which is the focus of a calibrated innovation policy that combines patents and FDA regulation. Pharmaceutical manufacturing lags far behind the innovative techniques found in other industries due to high regulatory barriers and ineffective intellectual property incentives. Among other challenges, although manufacturers tend to rely on trade secrecy because of the difficulty in enforcing patents
on manufacturing processes, trade secrecy provides limited incentives for innovation. To increase those incentives, this Article suggests several direct regulatory reforms and proposes novel ways to use those reforms to improve innovation policy
in drug manufacturing and beyond. For example, the FDA could operate a system
of temporary market exclusivity for manufacturing innovation parallel to the patent
system. Alternatively, the FDA could require disclosure of manufacturing methods
to drive the industry from opacity and trade secrecy towards transparency and patent protection for innovation. Overall, the potentially immense economic and
health benefits from more innovative manufacturing in the drug industry suggest
that manufacturing may be a profitable target of innovation policy in other highly
regulated industries and that manufacturing in general deserves a more prominent
place in innovation policy and theory.

INTRODUCTION
M&M chocolate candies are made with a precision far beyond the capabilities of many drug manufacturers. 1 This disparity is surprising because the drug
© 2014, W. Nicholson Price II. All rights reserved.
*
Academic Fellow, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at
Harvard Law School. J.D., Columbia Law School, 2011. Ph.D. (Biological Sciences), Columbia
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2010. I wish to thank Ana Bračič, Betsy Boggs, I. Glenn Cohen, Einer Elhauge, Abbe Gluck, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Philip Hamburger, Jordan Paradise, Ben
Roin, and Jeff Skopek for extensive comments and feedback. I received helpful advice and information from Emil Ciurczak, Ajaz Hussain, Bruce Leicher, Geoff Levitt, Girish Malhotra, and Hedley
Rees. I am also grateful for feedback from the participants of the Health Law Policy Workshop at
Harvard Law School and the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference. All errors are my own.
1
Telephone Interview with John Helferich, Former Senior Vice President of Research & Dev.,
Mars/Masterfoods (May 15, 2013); Telephone Interview with Ajaz Hussain, Former Deputy Dir. of
the Office of Pharm. Sci., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 24, 2013). Manufacturing in the drug in-
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industry is tightly regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—
which also regulates food production—and the quality of drugs has major implications for human health. Nevertheless, drug manufacturing is expensive, inefficient, and non-innovative, which leads to major problems for the healthcare system and society as a whole. 2
Drug recalls based on quality issues are one such problem. For example, in
2011, a record 2329 drug products were recalled.3 Quality issues and contamination during manufacturing or repackaging caused most of the recalls.4 Similarly,
in 2009, two drug manufacturers recalled contaminated batches of the crucial
anesthetic drug propofol, causing long-lasting shortages of the drug and one
manufacturer’s exit from the market. 5 In early 2012, Novartis recalled Excedrin
and other popular over-the-counter pills because some pill bottles contained
powerful opiates and broken tablets in addition to their intended contents. 6 The
drugs did not return to the shelves for seven months. 7 And in 2012 and 2013,
fungal contamination of steroid injections made by the New England Compounding Center resulted in forty-eight deaths from fungal meningitis 8 and hundreds of additional infections across twenty-three states. 9

dustry has also been characterized as “far behind [that] of potato-chip and laundry-soap makers.”
Leila Abboud & Scott Hensley, New Prescription for Drug Makers: Update the Plants—After Years of
Neglect, Industry Focuses on Manufacturing; FDA Acts as a Catalyst, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at
A1. Little has changed in the past decade. Agnes Shanley, The Pulse of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, PHARMAMANUFACTURING.COM (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/
2012/050.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J38X-2U3A.
2
See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (examining the costs of drug manufacturing);
infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text (describing the lack of innovation in the industry); infra
notes 142–153 and accompanying text (discussing the industry’s adherence to outdated manufacturing
techniques out of fear of regulatory approval delay).
3
Agnes Shanley, cGMP Judgment Day, PHARMAMANUFACTURING.COM (Dec. 3, 2012), http://
www.pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/2012/159.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KN9Q-N99U.
4
Id.
5
Valerie Jensen & Bob A. Rappaport, The Reality of Drug Shortages—The Case of the Injectable
Agent Propofol, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 806, 806 (2010).
6
Eryn Brown, Recall: Mix-up Pulls Excedrin, Bufferin, Other Meds off Shelves, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
9, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/09/news/la-heb-novartis-excedrin-recall-painkillers20120109, archived at http://perma.cc/TTF9-ZW6Z.
7
Jie Jenny Zou, Excedrin Production Resumes, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/health/2012/07/26/excedrin-production-resumes, archived at http://perma.cc/FUB3M85J.
8
Lethal Medicine Linked to Meningitis Outbreak, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57573470/lethal-medicine-linked-to-meningitis-outbreak, archived at
http://perma.cc/4SFA-S4KK.
9
Jordan Paradise, Follow-on Biologics: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities: Foreword, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2011); Lethal Medicine Linked to Meningitis Outbreak,
supra note 8.
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Drug manufacturing problems are not limited to recalls and contamination.
Over 15% of the nation’s soaring healthcare costs are spent on drugs. 10 And up
to $50 billion is wasted on inefficient drug manufacturing annually. 11 Overall,
manufacturing costs comprise anywhere from 15% to over 50% of firm-level
revenue. 12 Reducing manufacturing expenses would create tremendous positive
social externalities, whether the savings were passed on to consumers (and the
government) through lower drug prices or reinvested into research and development (R&D) to increase future health gains. Depending on how the firm uses the
savings, a 20% reduction could create an annual consumer surplus worth $47.4
billion to $574 billion. 13 Despite these potential benefits, firms frequently use
outdated production techniques and old manufacturing plants with little innovative change to increase efficiency or quality. 14
This lack of innovation in drug manufacturing is striking because the drug
industry is otherwise a major and successful focus of innovation policy. 15 Intellectual property and the FDA’s regulatory barriers create carefully calibrated incentives for firms to discover and develop drugs. 16 In addition to their independ10
Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug Costs Dropped in 2012, but Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013,
at A1. Note that in 2012, drug expenditures actually dropped by around 1%. Id. This was due to many
popular drugs’ patents expiring at the same time, allowing generics to flood the market and, thus,
lowering drug expenditures. Id. This phenomena has been designated the “patent cliff,” and is not
expected to continue. Id.
11
Pradeep Suresh & Prabir K. Basu, Improving Pharmaceutical Product Development and Manufacturing: Impact on Cost of Drug Development and Cost of Goods Sold of Pharmaceuticals, 3 J.
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 175, 186 (2008). See generally infra notes 92–107 and accompanying text (discussing the potential cost-saving benefits of improving manufacturing processes).
12
See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (analyzing the differing manufacturing costs
across the drug industry’s three main sectors: brand-name small-molecule drugs, generic smallmolecule drugs, and biologics).
13
J.A. Vernon et al., Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Efficiency, Drug Prices, and Public Health:
Examining the Causal Links, 41 DRUG INFO. J. 229, 236 (2007). See generally infra notes 92–107 and
accompanying text (discussing the potential benefits of improving manufacturing processes).
14
See infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing and the resulting negative effects on the drug industry).
15
See infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text (describing the role patents play in encouraging drug discovery); infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (noting the FDA’s power to grant
market-exclusivity to certain drug producers and this power’s role in spurring drug R&D). This Article
uses the term “innovation” broadly, to include not only technological innovation, but also innovation
in business practices. See generally Daniel F. Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions Be Patentable?, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 265, 271–75 (2011) (describing how “business method inventions” are
important to economic growth). This Article also uses “innovation” to refer to the development of
costly bodies of information related to and underlying other forms of innovation. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
345, 366–72 (2007) (characterizing the FDA’s innovation policy role in promoting the creation of
costly information on drug safety and efficacy).
16
See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text (explaining that FDA regulations induce drug
discovery by creating barriers to entry that prevent competitors from entering the market); infra notes
205–212 and accompanying text (discussing the roles of patents and FDA regulatory exclusivity in
promoting drug discovery).
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ent effects, intellectual property and regulation work together because regulation
not only creates hurdles to overcome, but also enhances patent incentives. 17
Although the effects of innovation policy on drug discovery and development have been well studied, policy and academic debates about innovation incentives have largely ignored the important role of manufacturing innovation. 18
One of the goals of this Article is to secure a place for manufacturing in innovation theory. Manufacturing is important, but usually unproblematic. Innovative
products require successful manufacture and distribution to create significant
social welfare gains. In most industries, firms have sufficient incentives and face
sufficiently low hurdles to innovative manufacturing. 19 As a result, firms in other
industries improve manufacturing and reliably provide marketable products. 20
Yet, in the pharmaceutical industry, manufacturing has suffered from innovation
policy myopia. Patent law does not reward manufacturing innovation and FDA
regulations impede it, so firms tend not to innovate. 21 If manufacturing is better
understood through innovation theory, then policy prescriptions can use that theory to improve innovation in manufacturing in general and in the pharmaceutical
industry in particular.
Incentives are much weaker for innovative manufacturing than for innovative drug discovery. Both patents and FDA action create periods of market exclusivity for new drugs. 22 Furthermore, the FDA approval process itself
strengthens the market power of drug patents. 23 Patents on manufacturing processes, however, are very hard to enforce and do not receive a boost from the

17

See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text; infra notes 205–212 and accompanying text.
For a sample of the extensive literature focusing on innovation policy on drug discovery and
development, but not addressing manufacturing innovation, see generally, for example, Harvey E.
Bale Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 95 (1996);
Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461 (2009); Brian R. Bouggy, Follow-on Biologics Legislation:
Striking a Balance Between Innovation and Affordability, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 367 (2010); Eisenberg, supra note 15; Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 479 (2008); Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV.
645 (2011); Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005).
19
See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (noting that the drug industry still lags in implementing modern manufacturing techniques that were developed in the 1980s and readily adopted in
other industries).
20
See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 122–283 and accompanying text (outlining how intellectual property and the
FDA fail to incentivize manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry).
22
See infra notes 223–283 and accompanying text (discussing the roles and shortcomings of
patents and FDA market exclusivity in encouraging manufacturing innovation).
23
See infra notes 136, 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing patents and how FDA approval requirements strengthen the exclusivity of patents).
18
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FDA. 24 Firms therefore forego manufacturing patents for trade secrets. But trade
secrets block cumulative innovation and may insufficiently reward some important types of manufacturing innovation. 25 Other industries may also face inadequate incentives for manufacturing innovation but do not face the intense
regulatory barriers present in the pharmaceutical industry.
The drug industry’s regulatory barriers also slow manufacturing innovation.
Rather than enhancing and fine-tuning innovation incentives, FDA regulations
obstruct manufacturing innovation by raising significant barriers to innovative
change, both before and after drug approval. 26 Firms avoid introducing new
technologies when seeking approval based on historically justified fears of preapproval delay from reviewers leery of new technology. 27 After approval, changes to manufacturing processes face procedural hurdles that can wholly prevent
continual process improvement. 28 Substantive barriers also arise from regulatory
lock-in of both drug characteristics and associated manufacturing methods at an
early stage in drug development, before firms optimize manufacturing.29 Pervading the innovative landscape is one final barrier: a form of self-imposed technological standard created by industry-wide adherence to technical examples in
FDA guidance documents. 30
Broader than any specific failure of innovation or regulation is the mismatch between the two. The classic justification for intellectual property is that it
increases innovation incentives above the socially suboptimal investment baseline; 31 this occurs against an assumed background of regulatory freedom to innovate. When intellectual property incentives are less effective, but innovation is
substantially unhampered by regulation, firms can still innovate at or slightly
24

See infra notes 226–240 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties of enforcing process
patents); infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (explaining that, unlike drug discoveries, FDA
regulations do not create market exclusivity for manufacturing innovations).
25
See infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (analyzing trade secret’s role and shortcomings
in promoting manufacturing innovation).
26
See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (explaining how FDA regulations create hurdles to manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry).
27
See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text (discussing preapproval barriers for new drug
applications and describing the FDA’s resistance to accepting a new manufacturing technique: high
performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”)).
28
See infra notes 171–183 and accompanying text (discussing postapproval filing requirements
for major, moderate, and minor process changes).
29
See infra notes 184–204 and accompanying text (discussing postapproval FDA regulatory lockin).
30
See infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text (providing an example of the industry’s pervasive blind adherence to FDA examples by describing the development of the industry’s three-batch
standard for certain tests resulting from the FDA’s use of three batches in a guidance document).
31
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30–31 (1991); see infra notes 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing
patent structure and why patents fail to incentivize manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry).
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above that baseline. This is the case with manufacturing methods in many industries. And when regulatory restrictions are intense and costly, but policy rewards
are high, firms still innovate because policy-driven benefits of innovation exceed
the costs. This is the case with the development of new drugs because development requires costly clinical trials, but receives effective patent protection and
regulatory market exclusivity. But when regulatory burdens to innovation are
high and exclusivity incentives are weak and ineffective, the net motivation to
innovate is low. This is the case with drug manufacturing.
As a result of ineffective innovation policy, drug manufacturing has been
close to stagnant for decades, lagging far behind the innovative manufacturing
advances of other industries. Even the regulatory standards now imposed reflect
a poorly controlled state of manufacturing. For instance, the amount of an active
ingredient in a drug can typically vary by as much as +/–10%, so the difference
between two approved tablets in the same bottle could be as much as 20%. 32
There is no simple complete solution to these problems. Given the broad
mismatch between regulatory hurdles and incentives, solutions could lessen hurdles, increase incentives, or do both. The relatively straightforward first step
would be to lessen current regulatory barriers to innovation to the extent possible
while letting the FDA ensure drug safety. This will itself allow more innovation,
but is unlikely to be enough, in part because even efficient and well-functioning
regulatory oversight imposes significant hurdles in the heavily regulated drug
industry.
More dramatically, the FDA could deliberately shape innovation incentives.
The effect of regulation on innovation has been studied before, 33 but previous
studies have paid much less attention to the way regulation could be used as a
policy lever to actively drive innovation by changing incentives. 34 The FDA administers incentives for drug discovery and development already. 35 This Article
suggests two possible approaches to expand and flexibly apply the FDA’s incentive-shaping approach to manufacturing innovation. First, a system of FDAmediated market exclusivity, parallel to that for drug approval, could be institut32
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: INVESTIGATING
OUT-OF-SPECIFICATION (OOS) TEST RESULTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 10 (2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm070287.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
JC4-6NJ4.
33
This literature is especially extensive in the area of environmental regulation. See generally,
e.g., Jens Hemmelskamp, Environmental Policy Instruments and Their Effects on Innovation, 5 EUR.
PLAN. STUD. 177 (1997); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation,
43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative
Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981); Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation
as the Mother of Innovation: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. &. POL’Y 348 (2005).
34
A few articles have been written in the context of the FDA and drug discovery. See generally,
e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 15; William E. Ridgway, Note, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy
Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221 (2006).
35
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 359–64, 366–72.
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ed. Alternatively, the FDA could mandate disclosure to drive the industry towards far greater transparency about manufacturing methods, destroying the effectiveness of trade secrecy but replacing it with a newly enhanced ability to
enforce manufacturing process patents.
Part I of this Article evaluates the state of the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, describing the costs of making drugs, failures of innovation, and
potential benefits of increased innovation. 36 Part II then describes the regulatory
and intellectual property reasons for manufacturing stagnation. 37 Finally, Part III
suggests potential regulatory solutions to increase innovation, including both
pure regulatory and incentive-shifting possibilities. 38
I. THE STATE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing is either the largest or second-largest expense for pharmaceutical firms.39 Nonetheless, drug manufacturing is surprisingly inefficient, lagging significantly behind the modernized manufacturing techniques of other industries; the industry was recently characterized as being “in the dark ages with
respect to . . . efficiency.”40 This manufacturing lag is a major problem. The drug
industry could save tens of billions of dollars annually by modernizing manufacturing, with even larger social welfare benefits.
Section A of this Part discusses the high costs of manufacturing across the
industry’s three main segments. 41 Section B analyzes the various causes and effects of the industry’s current lack of manufacturing innovation. 42 Finally, Section C discusses the potential benefits from updating manufacturing processes,
including reduced costs and improved quality. 43

36

See infra notes 39–121 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 122–331 and accompanying text.
38
See infra notes 332–444 and accompanying text.
39
Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharmaceutical Companies, 3 J. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 30, 33 fig.1 (2008); see infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (discussing manufacturing costs). For brand-name and biologics companies, sales and marketing are generally
the highest costs, and for generics, manufacturing is by far the largest cost. See infra notes 44–59 and
accompanying text.
40
Joanne Eglovitch, Regulatory Relief Explored for QbD Use in Post-Approval Changes, GOLD
SHEET (Aug. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-goldsheet/46/8/regulatory-relief-explored-for-qbd-use-in-postapproval-changes (quoting Moheb Nasr, Vice
President of Regulatory Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls Strategy for GlaxoSmithKline and
former Director at the FDA’s Office of New Drug Quality Assessment).
41
See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text.
42
See infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text.
43
See infra notes 92–121 and accompanying text.
37
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A. High Costs of Manufacturing Across the Pharmaceutical Industry
Widespread misperceptions that drug manufacturing is very inexpensive44
arise from a focus on marginal costs. 45 Marginal costs are frequently very low,
especially for blockbuster small-molecule drugs. 46 Other drugs, however, typically have higher marginal costs.47 Furthermore, the industry as a whole has very
high fixed costs, including building factories, maintaining quality control, and
depreciating capital assets; these more inclusive expenses, reported as “Cost of
Goods Sold” (COGS) as a percentage of total revenue, comprise a large fraction
of pharmaceutical companies’ costs. 48
Manufacturing costs differ across the drug industry’s three segments:
brand-name production of small-molecule drugs, generic production of smallmolecule drugs, and primarily brand-name production of biologics. For researchoriented brand-name pharmaceutical firms, COGS were approximately 26% of
sales between 1994 and 2006. 49 Generics spent more on manufacturing, averag-

44
See Jennifer S. Bard, What to Do When You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposal to
Protect the Public’s Health by Providing Whistleblower Protection for Medical Researchers, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 1, 34 (2012) (noting that “once a drug is developed, it costs very little to manufacture”); Irwin I. Park, Extinguishing Exclusive Marketing Rights: Interpreting the Medical Innovation
Prize Fund Act of 2011, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 183, 214 n.217 (2011) (arguing
that drug innovation prizes could increase profits, “assuming that manufacturing costs are minimal”).
45
Marginal costs measure the cost of manufacturing one extra pill. Cf. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel
F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 868
n.43 (1996) (defining “marginal cost”). For example, marginal cost is the price of going from the onemillionth pill to the one-million-and-first pill. Cf. id. Fixed and marginal production costs vary by
drug, and precise production costs are generally unavailable. Ernst R. Berndt et al., Information, Marketing, and Pricing in the U.S. Antiulcer Drug Market, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 100, 100 (1995).
46
See Outterson, supra note 18, at 253 (noting that although most drug manufacturers do not
disclose patented drugs’ marginal manufacturing costs, differential pricing ratios can be used as a
proxy: “[They] currently exceed 30:1 in [anti-retroviral] drugs, implying marginal costs of production
in the range of 3 to 4%.”).
47
See Berndt et al., supra note 45, at 100 (suggesting that for one group of anti-ulcer drugs, marginal production costs ranged from 10–25% of the drugs’ price).
48
See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text (explaining the various COGS of different industry segments and noting that COGS can account for over half of some firms’ revenues).
49
Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33 fig.1; see also Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost
of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5
PLOS MED. 29, 29–30 (2008), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetchObject.action?
uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0050001&representation=PDF, archived at http://
perma.cc/8KA6-M66F (reporting that, according to one study, ten of the largest global pharmaceutical
firms spent 30% of total revenue on COGS and 12% on R&D between 1996 and 2005). Large drug
companies’ annual reports support these survey-based conclusions. See, e.g., GLAXOSMITHKLINE, DO
MORE, FEEL BETTER, LIVE LONGER: ANNUAL REPORT FOR SHAREHOLDERS 136–37 (2011),
http://www.gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/GSK-Annual-Report-2011.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/VBZ9-DJV2 (reporting COGS of 26.8% in 2011 and 26.7% in 2010); PFIZER, 2012
FINANCIAL REPORT 15 (2012), http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualreport/2012/financial/financial2012.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MQ8J-3GAL (reporting COGS of 21.6% in 2011 and 22.7% in 2010).

2014]

Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

499

ing 52%. 50 Generics’ COGS are a higher fraction of total sales for several reasons, including lower consumer prices 51 and lower R&D, compliance, and marketing costs. 52 Although it is not a priori obvious that absolute (as opposed to
fractional) manufacturing costs should be lower for generic companies, 53 and
although hard numbers are difficult to obtain, industry experts nevertheless suggest that generics also have lower per-unit costs. 54
Biologics also face high manufacturing costs. 55 The manufacture of biologics has been characterized as “highly complex and requir[ing] high capital investments.” 56 Both fixed and variable manufacturing costs are higher for biolog-

50

Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33 fig.1; see also TEVA PHARM. INDUST. LTD., FORM 20-F: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 6

(2011), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTI2OTcyfEN
oaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1, archived at http://perma.cc/YD8P-Z7NT (reporting COGS as
48% of sales in 2011 and similar levels in the previous four years.).
51
Lower consumer prices mean that if absolute manufacturing costs are the same, COGS as a
fraction of total sales will be higher. For instance, if it costs $1 to make a pill that sells for $10 as a
brand-name pill but $2 as a generic pill, COGS would be 50% of total sales for the generic but only
10% for the brand.
52
Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33–34.
53
For example, brand-name manufacturers could potentially optimize the manufacturing process
over years of experience with the drug. See Christopher S. Ponder, Comment, The Dubious Value of
Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 555, 575 (2008) (“In the generic market, the pioneer
manufacturer likely enjoys lower manufacturing costs due to valuable experience gained from producing the drug for the duration of its patent.”). Empirically, however, incremental innovation tends not to
occur, and older techniques persist instead. See Prabir Basu, Today’s Hidden Crisis in Health Care:
The State of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, RPM REP., Sept. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.
nipte.org/docs/RPM_REPORT.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XR2-WFSD (“The interplay of tight
FDA regulation to ensure product safety, the high cost of re-approval of process innovations and inadequate science-based understanding of pharmaceutical science and manufacturing ensures that once a
manufacturing process is approved, it is left substantially unchanged for the duration of the product
life.”); see also infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing).
54
See Mark Herlant, Restoring the Balance: A Strategic Role for Operations, in THE PATHWAY TO
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 64, 68 (Thomas Friedli et al. eds.,
2010) (“To date, no research-based ‘big pharma’ company has been able to build a COGS model that
would allow it to compete in the generics arena.”).
55
Biologics include therapeutic proteins and other products of living sources. Paradise, supra
note 9, at 502; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2006) (defining “biological product” as, “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product,
protein . . . , or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine . . . , applicable to
the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings”).
56
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 153 (Thomas Friedli et al.
eds., 2006) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE]. Biologics can be modified in various and sometimes unpredictable ways during their synthesis; for example, biologics can vary across production
systems or batches, and even in a single production batch. Paradise, supra note 9, at 502–03 (noting
that production and storage processes cause biologics to have high variations rates than other types of
drugs); see Michael Butler, Animal Cell Cultures: Recent Achievements and Perspectives in the Production of Biopharmaceuticals, 68 APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECHNOLOGY 283, 286–88 (2005)
(discussing variations in glycans tests).
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ics than for small-molecule drugs. 57 Fractional manufacturing costs are lower, at
14% of total sales, 58 because biologics companies spend significantly more on
R&D than small-molecule companies and because the prices for biologics are
generally very high, leading to higher fractional operating income. 59 Even
though manufacturing comprises a smaller portion of expenses for biologics, it
remains a significant factor in the dynamics of market entry and market maintenance.
Overall, drug manufacturing makes up a very large portion of industry expenses across the different types of pharmaceutical firms. Despite the size of
manufacturing costs, manufacturing is inefficient and non-innovative, which
drives costs even higher.
B. Lack of Innovation of Manufacturing Processes
Pharmaceutical manufacturing has lagged far behind other industries in
adopting modern manufacturing techniques. 60 These modern techniques, including continuous improvement of processes, quality management throughout production, constant monitoring of production parameters, and waste reduction,
were developed principally beginning in the 1980s and spread through automotive, consumer goods, and other industries, 61 but generally not the drug industry. 62 This lag has resulted in overall poor operational performance in drug manufacturing, 63 characterized by specific related deficiencies—including excessive
process rigidity, old plants and equipment, slow development and adoption of
57
Compare Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?,
25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1294 (2006) (reporting that in 2006, an average plant for biologic production
was estimated to cost $250–450 million to construct), with Pharma Closed How Many US Plants This
Year?, EXPERTBRIEFINGS.COM (Dec. 14, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://www.expertbriefings.com/news/
pharma-closed-how-many-us-plants-this-year/, archived at http://perma.cc/FR8Z-5L5F (reporting that
an average plant for small-molecule drug production can be built for $41 million). The materials for
biologics manufacturing also cost many times that of small molecules. Grabowski et al., supra, at
1294.
58
Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33 fig.1.
59
See id. at 34 figs.3 & 4. One 1994–2006 study found that R&D typically comprised 26% of
total sales for biologics companies versus 13% and 8% for brand-name and generic small molecule
drug companies, respectively. Id. at 34 fig.3. The same study found that operating income for biologics companies comprised 22% of the companies’ total sales, versus 19% and 12% for brand-name and
generics, respectively. Id. at 34 fig.4.
60
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 24.
61
Id. at 30–33.
62
Id. at 24–25; see also Lawrence Yu, Pharmaceutical Quality by Design: Product and Process
Development, Understanding, and Control, 25 PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 781, 786 (2008) (noting that
in 2008, pharmaceutical development scientists had “just begun” using process simulation to support
manufacturing optimization and product development, even though process simulation had been “successfully used in the chemical and oil industries since the early 1960s”).
63
See Herlant, supra note 54, at 67 (noting very large gaps between pharmaceutical company
performance and “best in class” performance on cycle times, stock turn, and equipment use, and
smaller gaps with respect to time in full and reworking products).
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novel technology, underutilized equipment and inefficient procedures, a lack of
continuous process monitoring, and significant waste. 64
Process rigidity, where manufacturing parameters remain static over the
lifetime of the drug, 65 is a defining characteristic of pharmaceutical manufacturing, as opposed to other industries, where flexibility and continuous improvement are crucial for efficient and innovative manufacturing. 66 FDA oversight
contributes to this process rigidity. 67 Because clinical trials are the foundation of
the FDA’s initial determination that an approved drug is safe and effective, formulations and manufacturing techniques used in mass production must match
the processes used in the clinical trials. 68 But regulatory submissions on drug
characteristics are typically based on relatively limited and shallow information. 69 Thus, the manufacturing conditions described in the initial submission
become somewhat arbitrary regulatory commitments that must be kept in future
manufacturing. 70
Process rigidity also encourages drug manufacturers to continue using outdated production lines and older equipment. The industry’s factories have been
generally described as “in terrible shape.” 71 Many facilities and primary production lines are quite old. Some have been operating continually since the 1960s,
frequently running twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, with only limited upgrades.72 Outdated and overworked facilities increase the risk of contamination of sterile products, require “repeated or extensive manual interventions,”
(further increasing the risk of contamination), and can even shed glass or metal
shavings into the product. 73 One FDA Warning Letter to Ben Venue Labs, issued
after a 2011 plant inspection, described a plant with “severely dented” doors

64
See Prabir Basu, The Current State of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing—In Search of Science, in
THE PATHWAY TO OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 54, at
77, 79.
65
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32.
66
Id. at 48; see also THE PATHWAY TO OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY, supra note 54, at 29 (noting that the pharmaceutical industry lags on continuous improvement).
67
See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (discussing the hurdles to manufacturing innovation that FDA regulations create).
68
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32.
69
Id. at 25.
70
Id.
71
Katie Thomas, Lapses at Big Drug Factories Add to Shortages and Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2012, at A1 (quoting Erin Fox, manager of the Drug Information Service at the University of
Utah).
72
J. Woodcock & M. Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile Injectable Drug Shortages, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOLGY THERAPEUTICS 170, 173 (2013).
73
Id.
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shedding rust into drug containers, rusty tools used for sterile line setup, and a
roof leaking water into sterile areas. 74
Outdated facilities and process rigidity also reflect a broader trend of slow
development and adoption of novel technologies in drug manufacturing. The
industry spends little on developing new manufacturing technologies and is slow
to adopt new processes once developed. 75 For example, the sorts of academicindustry collaborations that have become common both in drug discovery and in
other industries’ manufacturing sectors are just starting to emerge for pharmaceutical manufacturing. 76 One clear sign of the technological lag in drug manufacturing is that the industry still produces drugs step-by-step, in large batches,
as opposed to using continuous manufacturing (i.e., start-to-finish production
lines) like almost every other industry. 77
In addition to process rigidity, industry manufacturing procedures are plagued
with inefficiencies. Inefficiencies appear in the utilization of capital resources,78
74

Warning Letter from the U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Thomas J. Murphy, President & CEO,
Ben Venue Labs., Inc. 1–4, 19, 20 (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/UCM275843.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZH6T-KPQM.
75
See infra notes 130–154 and accompanying text (explaining that many firms do not adopt process innovations out of fear of delayed FDA approval).
76
See Todd Wallack, Novartis to Give MIT $65m to Find New Way to Produce Drugs, BOS.
GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2007, at A1 (reporting the development of the Novartis-MIT Center for Continuous
Manufacturing and illustrating its novelty); About C-SOPS, C-SOPS, http://ercforsops.org/about-csops, archived at http://perma.cc/AW28-ASJA (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (describing the Rutgers’
Engineering Research Center for Structured Organic Particulate Systems). See generally Daniel X.
Yang & Yunsoo A. Kim, Helping Science and Drug Development to Succeed Through PharmaAcademia Partnerships, 86 YALE J. BIO. MED. 429 (2013) (discussing academic-industry collaborations in drug discovery); Carlton Chen, Leveraging Opportunities Through University-Industry Collaboration, U. CONN. (July 30, 2013), http://news.engr.uconn.edu/manufacturers-roundtable-leveragingmfg-opportunities-through-university-industry-collaboration.php, archived at http://perma.cc/ME55AYU3 (discussing the University of Connecticut’s recent Manufacturers Roundtable meeting that was
held to encourage further collaborations with the University of Connecticut in various manufacturing
sectors).
77
See Wallack, supra note 76; About C-SOPS, supra note 76. Both the Novartis-MIT Center for
Continuous Manufacturing and Rutgers’ Engineering Research Center for Structured Organic Particulate
Systems focus on developing continuous manufacturing methods. See Novartis-MIT Center for Continuous Manufacturing, MASS. INST. TECHN., http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2012/07/26/excedrin-productionresumes, archived at http://perma.cc/FUB3-M85J (last visited Feb. 10, 2014); Technology Platforms, CSOPS, http://ercforsops.org/about-c-sops/technology-platforms, archived at http://perma.cc/33UY-49JM
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
78
Relative to other industries, equipment is underutilized in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. In a survey of European drug plants, nearly two-thirds of plant equipment was idle at any given
time. OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 60; see Herlant, supra note 54, at 67. Overall
equipment effectiveness (the percentage of scheduled runtime a piece of equipment produces good products) averages 20–30% in the drug manufacturing industry, compared to 50–90% in the automotive,
consumer packaged goods, aerospace, and computer industries. Bowman Cox, Attention Turns to the
Business Case for Quality by Design, GOLD SHEET (Jan. 1, 2009, 5:00 AM), available at http://
www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-gold-sheet/43/001/attention-turns-to-the-business-case-for-qualityby-design.

2014]

Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

503

management of finished product inventories79 and raw material stocks,80 and labor
practices.81
Quality tests in the drug industry are also outdated and inefficient. Pharmaceutical manufacturers ensure quality by discretely testing batches of drugs, typically at the end of production stages. 82 These discrete tests identify out-ofspecification products that must be discarded. 83 But discrete testing is less efficient than continuously monitoring product characteristics to guarantee quality
throughout production. 84 As a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers have much
higher error rates than permitted by regulation in final products. The combination of a lack of ongoing quality management and very strict final product standards leads to very high levels of unacceptable final products relative to other industries. Typically, between seven and 16% of products must be discarded in the
drug industry.85 Other industries with well-developed manufacturing, even those
with less strict final product standards, usually have manufacturing processes
that are more robust throughout production and thus require less end-testing and
fewer product discards. 86 The unpredictability inherent in stringent end-oriented
testing has both economic and human costs. A faulty product that makes it to the
end of the production line before testing can contribute to drug shortages if the
79

Pharmaceutical stock turns over on average 1–2 times per year, whereas consumer goods typically turn over 16–20 times per year and high tech goods can turn over as high as 50 times per year.
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 24–25. Slow turnover creates high inventory costs,
likely justified by a desire to avoid losing any possible sales. Id. at 63.
80
Xiaojun Wang, Inventory Management in a Pharmaceutical Company: Minimizing Discard
Practices 25–28 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished Master of Engineering in Manufacturing dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library). Excessive stocks of materials may be overcautiously (by the company’s own standards) maintained to
avoid any possibility of production delays, which can result in significantly higher inventory costs and
rates of discarding expired materials. See id. at 54–59; see also id. (finding in one case study that
ingredient stocks at an active pharmaceutical ingredient plant could be reduced by 43% while still
meeting the company’s own stringent requirements for backup supplies).
81
Labor value-add time (how much time is spent adding value to the product) is typically around
20% in a pharmaceutical plant, whereas in the automotive industry, value-add time is typically around
60–70% or higher. Cox, supra note 78. The ratio of direct labor (people actually making drugs) to
indirect labor (management, quality control, and engineering) is roughly ten times lower than in other
industries. Id.; see OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 57.
82
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 75.
83
See id.
84
Id. Continuous monitoring is more efficient because it allows manufacturers to spot errors and
make corrections quicker. Anne Trafton, Continuous Drug Manufacturing Offers Speed, Lowers
Costs, MASS. INST. TECH. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/manufacturing-pharma
ceuticals-0312.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8T7T-7AL8. Note that continuous monitoring is different from continuous manufacturing. Continuous monitoring involves constantly measuring product
quality during manufacturing processes. Continuous manufacturing describes the difference between a
constant-in/constant-out assembly-line system and one where large batches of a product go through
separate and sequential process steps. See Wallack, supra note 76.
85
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 76.
86
Id.
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batch is discarded, or product recalls if testing fails to catch the problem before
distribution. 87
Quality testing also takes a long time and disrupts manufacturing. 88 This
disruption is magnified by FDA regulations requiring that any out-ofspecification test results be addressed by a full investigation before retesting to
validate the result or continuing the manufacturing process. 89 Quality control
thus consumes a large portion of manufacturing time and creates tremendous
variability in cycle time, which itself leads to other inefficiencies. In one plant
with an average production time of 250 days, a stunning 237 of those days were
used for quality assurance and quality control. 90
This dire picture is not universal in the drug industry. Some industry leaders
have embraced some modern manufacturing techniques. Those leaders that have
pursued manufacturing innovation have experienced concomitant gains in efficiency and continuous control over drug quality. 91 But even those leaders face
substantial barriers to innovative change. And overall, drug manufacturing continues to be highly inefficient and non-innovative compared both with other industries and with earlier stages in the life of a drug. These inefficiencies and outdated techniques have major implications for the industry, the healthcare system,
and society as a whole.
C. Potential Benefits from Improving Manufacturing Processes
Manufacturing innovation would lead to major improvements. The potential efficiency gains have frankly stunning monetary and health implications.
Gains to drug quality and reliability have less quantifiable but still important
implications for the industry and society.
1. Reduced Costs
Tens of billions of dollars are spent annually on manufacturing inefficiencies. Efficiency increases consequently carry large potential benefits. One study
found potential yearly savings of $19 million in COGS for a single billion-dollar

87

See Yu, supra note 62, at 782; infra notes 108–121 and accompanying text (discussing recent
contamination events and drug shortages).
88
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 72.
89
21 C.F.R. § 211.192 (2013) (“Any unexplained discrepancy . . . or the failure of a batch or any
of its components to meet any of its specifications shall be thoroughly investigated, whether or not the
batch has already been distributed . . . .”).
90
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 125–26. Similarly, the process for manufacturing the main active ingredient in Schering-Plough/Merck’s cholesterol drug Vytorin reportedly includes 21.7 days of manufacturing and 63 days of testing and quality control/quality assurance. Wang,
supra note 80, at 14.
91
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 82–130.
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blockbuster drug, with lifetime revenue increases of $577 million. 92 Estimated
potential savings to the pharmaceutical industry worldwide range from $15 to
$90 billion yearly. 93
Another study analyzed the potential social gains from industry-wide drug
manufacturing improvements. 94 The study described two possible boundary scenarios resulting from various hypothetical increases in manufacturing efficiency,
which in turn would decrease the marginal cost of producing drugs. 95 In the first
scenario, lower manufacturing costs result in lower prices to consumers. 96 This
should occur in fully competitive markets where marginal price equals marginal
cost at equilibrium. 97 But even in monopolies or oligopolies, where profitmaximizing firms have the ability to price above marginal cost, orthodox economics predicts that lower manufacturing costs will decrease prices, resulting in
consumer surplus. 98 In this orthodox model, an industry-wide 20% reduction in
pharmaceutical manufacturing costs, totaling between $20 and $30 billion,99
would lead to estimated yearly consumer surplus gains of $47.4 billion in the
United States. 100
In the study’s second boundary case, manufacturers stray from the orthodox
market model by holding prices steady. 101 The resulting increased cash flow
from sales would tend, both theoretically and empirically, to increase firm R&D
expenditures. 102 An industry-wide 20% decrease in manufacturing costs, if pric92

Suresh & Basu, supra note 11, at 186. Revenue increases include the effect of earlier peak drug
availability, measured over the lifetime of the drug. See id. at 185–86.
93
Id. One early-moving major drug company, GlaxoSmithKline, has estimated that its own ongoing program of optimizing manufacturing operations will deliver annual pretax savings of approximately £2.8 billion ($4.5 billion) by 2014. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, supra note 49, at 55. The program
cost approximately £4.9 billion ($7.7 billion) to implement. Id.
94
Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 229–30, 237.
95
Id. Considering these to be “boundary scenarios,” the author of the study hypothesized that “the
actual effect of improved manufacturing efficiency [would] (possibly) exist[] somewhere between the
two model projections. Id. at 230.
96
Id. at 230–34.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Suresh & Basu, supra note 11, at 186.
100
Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 234 tbl.1. This study also calculates the total benefit of these
savings in all future years, assuming other factors hold constant, and finds a total value of $676.7
billion. Id.
101
Id. at 234–37.
102
John A. Vernon, Examining the Link Between Price Regulation and Pharmaceutical R&D
Investment, 14 HEALTH ECON. 1, 3, 6 (2005) (noting that reducing price regulation encourages firms
to invest more in R&D); see F. M. Scherer, The Link Between Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical
R&D Spending, 20 HEALTH AFF. 216, 220 (2001) (explaining that firms are rent-seeking with R&D
and are thus more likely to invest in R&D as profit opportunities increase). The intuition behind this
result is that firms invest in R&D by funding projects in order from most promising to least promising
until the marginal expected return for a project equals the marginal cost of additional capital. See
Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 235–37. When a firm’s cash flow increases, as here through lower
manufacturing costs and steady prices, the available cash has a lower cost of capital than borrowing
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es hold constant, would lead to a $3.9 billion one-time increase in annual R&D
flows. 103 The present value of that increase, taking into account patterns of R&D
growth over time, is $110.4 billion. 104 Increases in pharmaceutical R&D, in turn,
have large effects on social welfare because newly discovered drugs can improve
health outcomes and improve life expectancy. One scholar estimated that each
$1345 invested in pharmaceutical R&D leads to health increases with a value of
one U.S. life-year. 105 Using this estimate, a 20% reduction in manufacturing
costs would result in an annual gain of 5.7 million life-years through increases in
R&D spending. 106 Using a benchmark approximate value of $100,000 for a lifeyear, the annual value of this health increase would be $574 billion. 107
Even though the study’s two estimates are stylized, the social gains of even
moderately increased pharmaceutical manufacturing efficiency are easily measured in the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars.
2. Improved Quality
In addition to lowering costs, manufacturing innovation can improve drug
quality. Innovative processes that ensure quality throughout the production process can increase final drug quality more cheaply and effectively than increased
end-stage testing, largely because drug production is currently far less developed
and exacting than drug testing. 108 Resulting improvements in drug quality could
improve human health and well-being by reducing quality failures such as contamination events and drug shortages.
Contamination events and other major quality control failures cause loss of
life and decrease confidence in the industry, both of which may lead to even further health ramifications. 109 Such quality failures include the Chinese heparin
funds or issuing new equity. Id. Accordingly, more R&D projects are worth funding. Vernon et al.,
supra note 13, at 235–37. This logic relies on the theoretical assumption that capital markets are imperfect.
103
Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 236 tbl.2.
104
Id.
105
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Sources of U.S. Longevity Increase, 1960–1997, at 17, (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
8755,
2002),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8755.pdf?new_window=1, archived at http://perma.cc/9TMZ-EX8G.
106
See Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 236 tbl.3. Vernon calculated an all-years present value gain
of 82.1 million life years; using his estimated 7% discount rate, this gives a yearly gain of 5.7 million
life-years. Id.
107
See id. The study calculated an $8.2 trillion present value of the all-years increase, which
equates to a yearly gain of approximately $574 billion using a 7% discount rate. Id.
108
See Basu, supra note 64, at 78.
109
See Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Address at the
2013 CBI Pharmaceutical Compliance Congress (Jan. 29, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2013/civ-speech-130129.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RV9E6YPP) (“Weak enforcement that encourages deviations from [good manufacturing practices] and
noncompliance in this area affects the entire industry, as it erodes the confidence of the American
public in our drug system.”); see also Larry Rosania, Heparin Crisis 2008: A Tipping Point for In-
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crisis of 2008 that killed over 81 people 110 and the 2012 meningitis outbreak
from contaminated steroids, which has so far killed 64 people and sickened 751
more across 20 states. 111 Using outdated and decrepit manufacturing equipment
directly contributes to the likelihood of contamination events and quality problems. 112
Failing to innovate also contributes. Greater process understanding, increased in-line monitoring, and more modern techniques all could create higherquality and safer drugs. For instance, some modern techniques can monitor the
uniformity and concentration of ingredients in drug tablets, rather than merely
testing a very few samples at the end of production. 113 Most companies, however, have not embraced this type of innovation, in part for the reasons described
below.
Improving manufacturing could also help alleviate drug shortages. Drug
shortages are an ongoing and increasing problem. 114 Shortages are estimated to

creased FDA Enforcement in the Pharma Sector?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491–92 (2010) (describing loss of life resulting from quality control failures).
110
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), Apr.
22, 2008, at 1 (reporting 81 deaths in the crisis); see also Rosania, supra note 109, at 491–91 (attributing 150 deaths to the crisis).
111
Multistate Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections—Case Count, CDC, http://
www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis-map-large.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9GER-VSL2 (last
updated Oct. 23, 2013); see Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Oversight Failures Documented in
Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, at A27. The affected steroids were manufactured in
a compounding pharmacy not directly subjected to FDA regulation. Id. The industry-wide innovation
deficiency created by regulation and intellectual property failures, however, directly impacts the technologies and techniques available to compounding pharmacies as well as more typical drug manufacturers.
112
See Margaret Hamburg, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the Generic Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (Feb. 22, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/
ucm340870.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/C3UK-UESA) (observing that there have been “too many
quality lapses throughout the pharmaceutical industry over the past few years[,]” connecting quality
problems to “aging facilities,” and noting that “instilling quality is equally important for . . . future pipeline[s] as well”).
113
See Eunah Lee et al., High-Throughput Analysis of Pharmaceutical Tablet Content Uniformity
by Near-Infrared Chemical Imaging, 21 SPECTROSCOPY 24, 24–25 (2006), available at http://www.
spectroscopyonline.com/spectroscopy/data/articlestandard/spectroscopy/472006/387571/article.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/3YF-84K8 (discussing near-infrared chemical imaging, which measures
active ingredients in drug tablets without destroying the samples).
114
See Kevin Born, Time and Money: An Analysis of the Legislative Efforts to Address the Prescription Drug Shortage Crisis in America, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 235, 237–38 (2012) (noting that in
2011, there were 267 such drug shortages, up from 211 in 2010, 166 in 2009, and 61 in 2005); see also
id. (noting that this trend is expected to continue, with even more shortages expected in the future). A
drug shortage is “a situation in which the total supply of all clinically interchangeable versions of an
FDA-regulated drug is inadequate to meet the current or projected demand at the user level.” CTR.
FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MAPP 6003.1, MANUAL OF POLICIES & PROCEDURES 7
(2012).
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have monetary costs totaling $416 million per year 115 and unknown human costs
in terms of patients dying, suffering adverse reactions, or delaying treatment. 116
In 2011, 73% of shortages were sterile injectable drugs, 117 many of which are
important front-line cancer treatments in widespread use, but shortages exist
across all dosage forms. 118 The ultimate causes of drug shortages are debated,
but most are closely linked to manufacturing problems. 119 In 2011, 46% of drugs
shortages were caused by quality issues, “including bacterial or mold contamination, tablet disintegration, and the presence of foreign particles such as glass or
metal in vials.”120 Manufacturing delay or capacity issues caused another 19% of
shortages, such as “when embedded quality problems with one product force
closure of a production line or facility for repairs, resulting in shortage of other
products (even those for which no quality problems had been detected).” 121 As a
result, manufacturing innovation and improvement to increase robustness, flexibility, and drug quality could significantly help shortages.
The human costs of manufacturing failures are large and apparently increasing. Improving innovation in manufacturing could help to reduce the incidence of manufacturing quality failures, especially those failures resulting in
harmful contamination events and direct human injury. Manufacturing innovation and the resulting increase in quality and flexibility could also reduce the
incidence of drug shortages. Presumably, more reliable and better controlled
manufacturing could increase drug uniformity and quality, which could then im115
See COLEEN CHERICI ET AL., NAVIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES IN AMERICAN HEALTHCARE: A
PREMIER HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE ANALYSIS 6 (2011), https://www.premierinc.com/about/news/11mar/drug-shortage-white-paper-3-28-11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LJB2-LAD6 (indicating that
shortages result in increased payments for drugs and shipping of approximately $200 million annually); Rola Kaakeh et al., Impact of Drug Shortages on U.S. Health Systems, 68 AM. J. HEALTH-SYSTEM
PHARMACY 1811, 1814 (2011) (reporting that increased labor costs of time spent by pharmacists,
doctors, and nurses dealing with drug shortages cost an estimated additional $216 million annually).
116
See Born, supra note 114, at 239 (discussing the many potential adverse consequences patients
may face when doctors are forced to alter their medications due to drug shortages); Drug Shortages:
National Survey Reveals High Level of Frustration, Low Level of Safety, ISMP MEDICATION SAFETY
ALERT!: ACUTE CARE EDITION, (Inst. for Safe Medication Practices, Horsham, Pa.), Sept. 23, 2010, at
1, 1, available at http://www.ismp.org/newsletters/acutecare/articles/20100923.asp, archived at http://
perma.cc/WK3-2YH4 (same).
117
S.L. Kweder & S. Dill, Drug Shortages: The Cycle of Quantity and Quality, 93 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 245, 246 fig.1 (2013); Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 72, at 170.
118
Bruce A. Chabner, Drug Shortages—A Critical Challenge for the Generic-Drug Market, 365
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147, 2147–48 (2011).
119
Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 72, at 170–71; see CHERICI ET AL., supra note 115, at 2–3;
Chabner, supra note 118, at 2147–48.
120
Kweder & Dill, supra note 117, at 247.
121
Id. Twelve percent of shortages were due to discontinuations, which may also result from
quality problems. Id. at 247 fig.2; see Patricia M. Danzon & Nuno Sousa Pereira, Vaccine Supply:
Effects of Regulation and Competition, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 239, 265 (2011) (noting that because
vaccine manufactures are “[f]aced with low prices and volatile demand, [they] have chosen to exit
rather than incur the significant costs of bringing manufacturing capacity up to the high standards
required”).
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prove the predictability of medical treatment. Overall, manufacturing innovation
has the potential for major human health and industry cost benefits.
II. THE FAILURE OF INNOVATION POLICY IN PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURING
Innovation in drug manufacturing is vital for a well-functioning health system, and the innovation landscape is deeply shaped by legal rules and regulatory
structures. The limited literature that previously has addressed innovation problems in pharmaceutical manufacturing has focused largely on firm culture and
executive focus.122 Although these explanations undoubtedly contain some truth,
they do not address the role that legal rules and innovation policy play in slowing innovation. As a practical consequence of that theoretical lacuna, calibrated
policy successfully drives innovation in drug discovery and development, but
not in drug manufacturing.
Similar to drug discovery and development, innovations in drug manufacturing are frequently expensive to develop but relatively easy to copy once
122
See, e.g., OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32 (“Manufacturing has not been seen
as central in producing competitive advantage.”); Bowman Cox, Slogging Toward Quality by Design,
GOLD SHEET (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:00 PM), available at http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/thegold-sheet/46/12/slogging-toward-quality-by-design (citing a report by Ted Fuhr, pharmaceutical
consultant at McKinsey & Co.). Other institutional factors—identified in these sources, as well as in
conversations and interviews with pharmaceutical industry consultants, executives, and in-house and
outside counsel—may involve the typical background of pharmaceutical company executives in R&D
or sales rather than in manufacturing, the greater ease of promoting R&D advances to shareholders
over manufacturing improvements, and differences in training between manufacturing/operations
personnel and R&D personnel. See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32; Cox, supra. In
addition, given the realities of limited management capital and attention, management may focus
exclusively on incentives for drug discovery innovation, which tend to exceed those available for
manufacturing innovation. See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 155 (noting that “[a]s
long as gross margins on drugs are as high as today, questions on intellectual property are overriding
the question of manufacturing costs.”); see also Girish Malhotra, Financial Justification for QbD and
Cost of Regulation Compliance, PROFITABILITY THROUGH SIMPLICITY (May 22, 2012, 12:33 PM),
http://pharmachemicalscoatings.blogspot.com/2012/05/financial-justification-for-qbd-and.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HEZ6-GCGH (“Strategic manufacturing, technology innovation, higher
profits and shortened time to market are the QbD drivers. Industry should have been there fifty plus
years ago. [But, t]he current blockbuster business model absorbed all of the manufacturing deficiencies. Shareholders got accustomed to the fast paced introduction of new drugs and profits.”). Furthermore, blockbusters may have both higher potential profits and lower manufacturing costs than other
drugs. Matthew Harper, The Death of the Blockbuster Drug, FORBES (May 28, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sciencebiz/2010/05/28/the-death-of-the-blockbuster-drug/, archived at
http://perma.cc/HZ5X-5K99. High volume means fixed costs are lower per unit. Special Report:
Blockbuster Death and Growth of Generics, PHARMKON (Feb. 11, 2013), http://pharmakon.me/
2013/02/11/special-report-blockbuster-death-and-growth-of-generics/, archived at http://perma.cc/
J42G-7DMA. Marginal costs may also decrease due to economies of scale, especially for simply formulated small-molecule drugs. See id. Thus, if blockbusters are management-paradigm-defining,
effort will tend to be focused away from manufacturing innovation. Although these business and organizational factors may play a significant role alongside legal factors, a full accounting of them is far
outside the scope of this Article.
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known, making manufacturing innovations appropriate targets for intellectual
property incentives. 123 The intellectual property exclusivity incentives available
for manufacturing innovation, however, are less effective and have more serious
negative effects on innovation than those available for drug discovery and development. 124
Also like drug discovery and development, drug manufacturing is tightly
regulated to ensure public safety. 125 Regulatory structures for drug discovery and
development create incentives for innovation and interact cooperatively with
intellectual property to strengthen those incentives. 126 Conversely, regulatory
oversight for drug manufacturing actively inhibits innovation. 127
Section A of this Part describes how the FDA’s regulations inhibit manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 128 Section B discusses potential
innovation incentives from patents, FDA-administered market exclusivity, and
trade secrets. 129
A. Regulatory Hurdles to Innovation in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing
Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry occurs against a backdrop of
pervasive regulation. In the context of drug discovery and development, the regulatory system provides significant incentives for innovation. Most directly, the
FDA is statutorily authorized to provide market exclusivity as a reward to drug
companies for certain behaviors. 130 The FDA’s regulatory oversight also provides an indirect incentive to discover and develop new drugs. Firms develop
drugs in several stages. Typically, the firm takes the new drug through three
phases of clinical trials as an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) and then files
an extensive and expensive New Drug Application (“NDA”) to win approval to
123

See infra notes 248–269 and accompanying text (discussing the safe harbor under the HatchWaxman Act for using patented processes); infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (analyzing
the benefits and shortcomings of trade secrets for pharmaceutical manufacturing). The same may be
true for manufacturing in most industries. Other industries, however, generally do not need as large of
incentives to overcome the major regulatory hurdles faced by drug manufacturers. See infra notes
130–204 and accompanying text.
124
See infra notes 205–331 and accompanying text (discussing intellectual property in the pharmaceutical industry).
125
See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (discussing FDA regulations on pharmaceutical manufacturing).
126
See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text (explaining that FDA regulations induce drug
discovery by creating barriers to entry that prevent competitors from entering the market); infra notes
205–212 and accompanying text (discussing the roles of patents and FDA regulatory exclusivity in
promoting drug discovery).
127
See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (explaining the hurdles to innovation that
FDA regulations create for pharmaceutical manufacturing).
128
See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text.
129
See infra notes 205–331 and accompanying text.
130
See infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (describing FDA market exclusivity).
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sell the drug. 131 This costly regulatory gantlet creates a barrier to entry that can
keep competitor drugs off the market. 132 By excluding competitors, this regulatory system effectively extends monopoly pricing for the innovator company and
increases the reward for the initial innovation. 133 This effect operates on both
pioneer 134 and generic companies. 135 Finally, as discussed below, the FDA ap131
An IND is a filing that must be made with the FDA to allow a new drug to be transported across
states before the drug has received marketing approval and before commencing clinical trials (Phase I–III
testing). Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/investig
ationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/E8R6-HFZZ (last visited Feb. 25,
2014). The drug is classified as an IND during Phase I-III trials. See New Drug Application, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedand
approved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/R8MTH7LF (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). Phase I is the initial stage of clinical trials for an IND and focuses on
safety. The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Enduring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/U2KT-9Y8U (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). Phase II trials focus on ensuring the drug is effective.
Id. Finally, Phase III testing focuses on safety and effectiveness across varying populations. Id. If the
drug passes Phase I–III trials, the manufacturer then files an NDA. See New Drug Application, supra. If
the FDA approves the NDA, then the new drug is ready for market. See id. For a broader overview of the
drug development and approval process, see generally MARK P MATHIEU, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A
REGULATORY OVERVIEW (2008). Biologics require a Biologic License Application (“BLA”) instead of
an NDA. Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process (CBER), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Development
ApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/, archived at http://perma.cc/BEF4-BM2K
(last updated Feb. 13, 2010).
132
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation,
20 HEALTH AFF. 119, 121 (2001).
133
See id.
134
Pioneer companies can compete in the market for a drug class despite patent protection or
regulatory exclusivity preventing them from making an identical drug. For example, Lipitor, the alltime top-selling drug, is a statin, a class of drugs used to reduce cholesterol. Panos Kanavos et al.,
Product Differentiation, Competition and Regulation of New Drugs: The Case of Statins in Four European Countries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 455, 457, 459 (2007). Four other branded
statins with similar methods of action have also been widely marketed: Zocor, Leschol, Baychol, and
Pravachol. Id. at 457. Each additional new drug faced the same expensive regulatory hurdles to obtain
marketing approval, but entered a market with entrenched competition. In a study of statin market
share in four European countries, the first statin on the market maintained higher market share and
higher prices for a period after the entry of branded substitute statins, but all statins gradually converged to similar market shares, with some price differentiation remaining. Id. at 457, 459–61, 464.
Thus, because later market entrants face lower revenues, but the same high regulatory approval costs,
marginal market entrants (a hypothetical sixth branded statin) are deterred from entering. For very
large markets like statins, the hundreds of millions of dollars for regulatory approval may be balanced
by potential profits; for smaller markets, the same regulatory costs are correspondingly more important, deter more competition, and thus preserve monopoly or oligopoly pricing power.
135
Although the costs of generic approval are much lower, so are potential profits, which keeps
the regulatory barrier to entry significant. Eisenberg, supra note 132, at 121. In some circumstances,
however, the first generic entrant can obtain a 180-day window of exclusivity because the generic
company usually sells its drugs at near-monopoly prices within that window and, as a result, increases
profits tremendously. Id. at 122. No other generic companies have the benefit of this extra profit. See
id.
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proval process strengthens the exclusivity effects of drug patents by making the
patents much harder to invent around. 136
In the context of drug manufacturing, however, the FDA not only fails to
create incentives for innovation, it imposes significant limits on innovation. 137
First, institutional resistance to approving novel technologies restrains innovation during the NDA process. As a result, firms avoid innovative technologies in
NDAs for fear of delays in receiving marketing approval. Subsection 1 discusses
these preapproval regulatory barriers. 138 Second, some aspects of manufacturing
are mandated by current Good Manufacturing Practices (“cGMP”) regulations,
which create de facto technological standards that are not subject to firm-level
innovation. Subsection 2 discusses these de facto standards and their effect on
innovation. 139 Third, postapproval changes in manufacturing are hampered by
procedural hurdles of regulatory filings, known as supplemental NDAs
(“sNDAs”), and by substantive hurdles of regulatory lock-in of manufacturing
methods determined early in development. Subsection 3 analyzes these postapproval barriers. 140 All of these regulatory constraints are generally imposed
without considering their impact on manufacturing innovation and efficiency.141
1. Preapproval Barriers
The first and perhaps most pervasive barrier to innovation arises before approval and reflects a combination of typical agency practice and market dynamics, which together heavily dissuade firms from including novel technologies in
NDAs. An NDA—or an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for a
generic—must include “a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such
drug,” 142 which must be approved by the FDA. 143 The agency has historically
been reluctant to accept unfamiliar technologies, especially in NDAs. 144
136

See infra notes 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing patents’ role in the pharmaceutical
industry).
137
This Article does not claim that FDA’s innovation-dampening effect is deliberate. The reasons
behind specific manufacturing regulations may be the subject of future work. Notably, regulations that
block innovation run contrary to the common story of administrative agency capture by the regulated
industry. For a brief description and helpful notes on agency capture theory, see DANIEL CARPENTER,
REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE
FDA 36–43 (2010).
138
See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text.
139
See infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text.
140
See infra notes 168–204 and accompanying text.
141
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 126 (“[In] life sciences operations[,] . . . the
tendency is for compliance requirements to be imposed upon operations without adequate consideration for the effectiveness of the method or the implications on the overall process flow.”).
142
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D) (2012); see 21 C.F.R § 314.50(d)(1) (2013) (specifying the manufacturing and chemical disclosures that must be made on an FDA application). For ANDAs, see 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A), which outlines the specific information that must be contained in a ANDA
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For example, for roughly a decade beginning in the 1960s, several companies filed NDAs that included manufacturing controls that used a technique
known as high performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”). 145 At the time,
HPLC was considered technically superior to the previously dominant technology of thin-layer chromatography. 146 The FDA, however, was familiar with the
older technology and had approved its use. Thin-layer chromatography was also
used in the United States Pharmacopoeia (“USP”), a source of drug standards.147
Conversely, FDA reviewers were relatively unfamiliar with HPLC. As a result,
getting approval for an NDA that used HPLC was nearly impossible for that
decade; firms had to replace HPLC with an alternate technique to receive approval. 148 Eventually, the FDA was persuaded to accept HPLC as a validated
technique, and it is now widely used. 149
HPLC provides an early example of the difficulty pharmaceutical firms
face in trying to get new technology approved after the FDA started tightly regulating pharmaceutical manufacturing processes. HPLC also provides an unusual
example of firms persistently trying to obtain FDA approval of a new technique,
despite initial FDA rejections. Firms have learned from the HPLC experience—
and other similar situations—that even if a sponsor can eventually get FDA acceptance of an innovation, there is a risk of major delay in getting approval. This
lag in approval has very high costs for sponsor companies because any delay
cuts into the patent-protected period of market exclusivity, and brand companies
make the vast majority of their profits during this period. 150
Consequently, companies have very strong incentives to avoid incorporating any new technologies in NDAs. A Pfizer executive testified about this effect
to the FDA, describing an initial NDA draft that included two parallel ways to
measure a drug’s characteristic: the older method required shipping a sample
3500 miles, from Ireland to New Jersey, and took a week to get results, whereas
the newer method could be done on-site in the manufacturing plant in a matter of

application, and 21 C.F.R § 314.94(a)(9), which describes the information that must be included in an
ANDA manufacturing application, including a description of the utilized equipment.
143
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D), (j)(2)(A).
144
See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 67–68 (providing a persuasive account of the FDA’s riskaversion as based in concerns of personal and individual reputation).
145
Interview with Ajaz Hussain, supra note 1.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See generally GEORGE LUNN, HPLC METHODS FOR RECENTLY APPROVED PHARMACEUTICALS (1st ed. 2005) (detailing HPLC methods for assays of hundreds of recently approved drugs).
150
See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 637. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2013) (providing
for market exclusivity).
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minutes. 151 Due to worries about regulatory delays and associated costs, Pfizer
removed the second, innovative method from the NDA, declining to risk delay
in trying to get the new technique approved. 152 Even though the FDA does not
have an explicit policy of denying preapproval innovations, firms’ realistic fears
of delay consistently keep novel technologies out of NDAs. 153 Because other
regulatory barriers make changing manufacturing procedures postapproval difficult, 154 this preapproval barrier has effects that persist throughout the lifetime of
a drug.
2. Current Good Manufacturing Practices
The second type of barrier comes from the requirement that drugs be manufactured in compliance with cGMP regulations. 155 Generally, the FDA avoids
technology mandates; in terms of innovation, this is beneficial, as innovation
theory recognizes that innovation can be stifled when regulators require the use
of specific technologies. 156 Although cGMP regulations contain rigorous requirements on all aspects of drug manufacturing—including ventilation of production buildings, equipment maintenance and cleaning, and production and
control records for each batch, 157 these requirements are goal-oriented performance standards. 158 Nevertheless, the industry effectively creates de facto technology mandates by adhering tightly to technical examples in cGMP guidance
151
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENCE BOARD MEETING
140–43 (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3799t1_02.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NC45-KEDT.
152
Id.
153
See id.
154
See infra notes 168–204 and accompanying text (discussing procedural and substantive barriers to postapproval innovation).
155
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2012) ( “A drug . . . shall be deemed to be adulterated
. . . if . . . the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, its manufacture, processing, packing, or holding do not conform . . . with current good manufacturing practice . . . .”).
156
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 32, at 2 (technology mandates);
Gaia J. Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce Innovation to Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 165–74 (2012) (innovation theory);
Andries Nentjes et al., Technology-Forcing Through Environmental Regulation, 23 EUR. J. POL.
ECON. 903, 903–04 (2007) (same).
157
See 21 C.F.R. § 211.46 (2013) (ventilation of production buildings); id. § 211.67 (equipment
maintenance and cleaning); id. § 211.188 (production and control records).
158
See, e.g., id. § 211.63 (“Equipment used in the manufacture, processing, packing, or holding of
a drug product shall be of appropriate design, adequate size, and suitably located to facilitate operations for its intended use and for its cleaning and maintenance.”). One exception is an organizational
mandate that the quality control group must be separate from the manufacturing group. Id. § 211.22.
Manufacturing personnel are thus frequently less focused on regulatory quality, and quality control
personnel understand manufacturing less well and are less likely to seek regulation-compliant innovative changes. HEDLEY REES, SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DELIVERING
PATIENT VALUE FOR PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOLOGICS 120–22 (2011). Quality control enforces
regulatory requirements rather than seeking generally to improve quality. Id.
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documents which causes even more severe consequences than the common practice of treating guidance as effectively binding. 159 As a result, the industry narrows the diversity of acceptable technologies.
The most pervasive example of industry reliance on cGMP examples is
seen in the industry’s reaction to the FDA’s 1987 Guideline on General Principles of Process Validation. 160 That guidance, which described the way companies should validate processes, including manufacturing methods, stated the
principle that “[t]ests and challenges should be repeated a sufficient number of
times to assure reliable and meaningful results.”161 To illuminate this broad principle, the FDA included a single example: the Association for the Advancement
of Medical Instrumentation’s (“AAMI”) Guideline for Industrial Ethylene Oxide
Sterilization of Medical Devices, which required three repetitions. 162 From this
example, and just a few others mentioning three validation batches, the industry
almost uniformly accepted a procedure of using exactly three batches for validation of every process—whether or not three batches was actually “a sufficient
number of times to assure reliable and meaningful results,” 163 as the guidance’s
principle requires. The industry’s reliance on the three-batch regimen continues
today, although the FDA has recently sought to roll it back, 164 and in 2011 replaced the 1987 guidance altogether. 165

159

See Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm124782.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/PMH4-72H3 (last
updated Sept. 16, 2013) (observing that the industry adopted a certain standard based solely on a simple example provided in FDA guidelines). Guidance is explicitly nonbinding and includes disclaimers
to that effect. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 32, at 2 “FDA guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities.”).
160
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDELINE ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCESS VALIDATION (1987), available at http://babel.hathitrust.
org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015029699587;view=1up;seq=1, archived at http://perma.cc/X2Q4-H3U3; Questions and Answers on Current Good Manufacturing Practices, Good Guidance Practices, Level 2 Guidance—Production and Process Controls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm124782.htm#5, archived at http://perma.cc/
S2ZS-F48K (last updated Sept. 16, 2013) (discussing the industry and FDA reaction to the FDA’s 1987
guidelines).
161
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 160, at 16.
162
Id. at 16 n.7 (“For example, the AAMI Guideline for Industrial Ethylene Oxide Sterilization of
Medical Devices approved 2 December 1981, states: ‘The performance qualification should include a
minimum of 3 successful, planned qualification runs, in which all of the acceptance criteria are
met.’”).
163
See id. at 16 (imposing this sufficiency requirement); Questions and Answers on Current Good
Manufacturing Practices, Good Guidance Practices, Level 2 Guidance—Production and Process
Controls, supra note 160 (discussing the industry and FDA reaction to the FDA’s 1987 guidelines).
164
See Drugs, supra note 159 (noting that the drug industry adopted a three-batch standard based
in part on the 1987 Guidelines and specifying that the three-batch standard should not be generally
applied).
165
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDELINE FOR INDUSTRY: PROCESS VALIDATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (2011), available
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The industry thus self-imposes technological standards by adhering to
guidance examples over principles. This self-limitation is based on firms’ desires
to avoid regulatory delay or uncertainty. The limitation also reflects the industry’s preference for regulatory compliance over quality. 166 Like other technological standards, adhering to guidance examples hinders innovation. The FDA has
recently sought to deal with this industry-imposed restriction by simply refusing
to include examples in guidance documents. 167 Other innovation-increasing
changes may shift industry behavior from this pattern as well.
3. Postapproval Manufacturing Changes: Procedural and Substantive Barriers
Innovation in manufacturing can also take place after FDA approval of a
drug and its manufacturing method. The process of continual improvement is
central to manufacturing efficiency in other industries. Larger, discrete innovations can also be incorporated to improve production. Intuitively, manufacturers
that make a product for years should be better at the process because of their
experience, gained and applied through process tweaks and improvements. This
assumption, however, relies entirely on manufacturers’ ability to innovate manufacturing methods after FDA approval. In the petroleum processing industry, for
instance, continuous improvement of larger, discrete processing inventions has
been as valuable as the discrete inventions themselves.168 In contrast, the process
of improvement in drug manufacturing faces substantial hurdles from the FDA,
including both procedural barriers in the form of regulatory filings 169 and substantive barriers in the form of regulatory lock-in based on the empirical basis of
persistent drug specifications. 170

at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/%20.%20.%20.%20/Guidances/UCM070336.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/GP6Q-XBQH.
166
See JOHN AVELLANET, GET TO MARKET NOW! TURN FDA COMPLIANCE INTO A COMPETITIVE
EDGE IN THE ERA OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 187 (2010) (“Quality systems do not exist for the
sake of quality. . . . [They] exist to implement and maintain the quality system required by regulatory
health agencies and regulations.”).
167
See Interview with Emil Ciurczak, Consultant, Doramaxx Consulting (May 8, 2013) (noting
that this approach is increasingly frequent). For example, one recent FDA manufacturing equipment
draft guide reads: “When the [scale-up and postapproval changes (“SUPAC”)] equipment addenda
were published with tables referencing specific equipment, the tables were misinterpreted as equipment required by FDA.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SUPAC: MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT ADDENDUM 6 (2013), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UC
M346049.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WBT6-XTQL. As a result, the FDA goes on to say, the
“revised draft SUPAC addendum contains general information on SUPAC equipment and no longer
includes tables referencing specific equipment.” Id.
168
John L. Enos, A Measure of the Rate of Technological Progress in the Petroleum Refining
Industry, 6 J. INDUS. ECON. 180, 187–93 (1958).
169
See infra notes 171–183 and accompanying text.
170
See infra notes 184–204 and accompanying text.

2014]

Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

517

a. Procedural Barriers from Regulatory Filings
The FDA’s requirements that manufacturing changes be registered and approved impose the greatest procedural barrier for manufacturing innovation. 171
After receiving marketing approval, a sponsor must notify the FDA if it makes
any changes to an approved application. 172 Changes are categorized as major,
moderate, or minor. 173 Substantial regulatory submissions are required for major
and moderate changes. 174 Major changes require agency preapproval before implementation. 175 Any manufacturing change that “may affect the impurity profile
and/or the physical, chemical, or biological properties of the drug substance” is a
major change. 176 Minor changes, on the other hand, must be detailed in an annual report. 177 For changes in any category, the drug sponsor must evaluate the
change’s effects on product safety and efficacy and illustrate those effects
through appropriate studies to determine whether a supplement is needed. 178
The procedure for getting any change approved is costly. In addition to the
actual costs of preparing and submitting a manufacturing supplement, time is
required to prepare the supplement and to receive a decision from the FDA. Perhaps even more important, a supplement raises risks that the FDA might not approve the submission, which decreases the expected benefit of a change, and that
the FDA might reopen previously approved and settled manufacturing issues and
find new problems with the old method.
Overall, the system creates a substantial regulatory burden for postapproval
manufacturing innovations, with correspondingly larger burdens for larger
changes.179 Such procedural costs, when applied to every change, may complete171

OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 71.
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)–(d) (2013). Major notifications come in the form of an sNDA.
173
Id.
174
Id. § 314.70(b), (c). Moderate changes include changes to the container closure system that do
not affect drug quality, id. § 314.70(c)(2)(i); removing a test or relaxing a requirement to comply with
an official drug compendium, id. § 314.70(c)(2)(iii); and, for biologics, changes in production scale
that involve changing equipment or replacement of equipment with differently designed equipment
that does not otherwise change the production process, id. § 314.70(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(B).
175
Id. § 314.70(b)(3). In addition to the actual regulatory procedural hurdles, the requirement of
regulatory submissions creates intrafirm hurdles, because innovative ideas must be transferred from
the manufacturing department to the separate regulatory compliance department.
176
Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(iv). Major changes have “a substantial potential to have an adverse effect on
the identity, strength, quality, purity, or potency of the drug product as these factors may relate to the
safety or effectiveness of the drug product.” Id. § 314.70(b). They also include changes to the formulation or specification of the drug, including inactive ingredients. Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(i).
177
Id. § 314.70(d).
178
21 U.S.C. § 356a(b) (2012).
179
See supra notes 171–178 and accompanying text. Applications also burden the FDA, which
has been “overwhelmed by the number of Chemistry, Manufacturing, and Controls (CMC) supplements filed in recent years.” Yu, supra note 62, at 782. In 2005 and 2006, the Office of Generic Drugs
alone received over 3000 such manufacturing change supplements. Id. Over 1600 supplements were
filed for branded pharmaceuticals and over 800 for biologics. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
172
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ly prevent the type of continuous improvement that has been so successful in
driving efficiency in other industries. 180 Additionally, the costs associated with
small changes likely create a mindset that all changes are to be avoided as overly
troublesome and unprofitable. This mindset may shift efforts away even from
larger, net-beneficial innovations. 181 This reality of procedural barriers is also in
significant tension with the underlying theoretical goal that Good Manufacturing
Processes be “current.” 182
Overall, procedural barriers are a major limitation to manufacturing innovation, particularly with respect to implementing new techniques and procedures.
Because every manufacturing change involves a significant regulatory cost in
terms of money, time, and uncertainty, all innovation becomes less likely.183
From a structural perspective, a central pillar of manufacturing innovation in
other industries is continuous improvement through frequent small changes.
Those small changes are the least likely to justify the expense of regulatory apSERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2008: PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS FOR THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT 22 (2008), available at http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/
PDUFA/UCM209479.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AH8C-5T8R. Of the latter two sets, approximately one-third of supplements required prior approval and two-thirds did not. Id. Especially for
changes which require FDA approval before implementation, this can result in process delays of
months to manufacturers and major costs to the FDA. See id. at 23. Evaluating manufacturing supplements makes up roughly 11% of the FDA’s application workload. Prescription Drug User Fee Rates
for Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 45639, 45641 tbl.4 (Aug. 1, 2012).
180
See Yu, supra note 62, at 782 (“[T]he burdensome regulatory requirements of supplements
imposed on manufacturers for executing minor and incremental changes to manufacturing processes
and controls inhibits continuous improvement and strategies for the implementation of continuous
‘real time’ assurance of quality.”).
181
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 160 (noting that although regulatory barriers may hinder innovation, some firms may use the barriers as an excuse for not investing in and successfully improving on manufacturing processes).
182
Facts About Current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs), DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm169105.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/WAX5-PJBV (last updated May 2, 2013). According to the FDA, the flexibility in cGMP regulations allows companies to use modern technologies and innovative approaches
to achieve higher quality through continual improvement. Id. Accordingly, the “c” in cGMP stands for
“current,” requiring companies to use technologies and systems that are up-to-date in order to comply
with the regulations. Id. Systems and equipment that may have been “top-of-the-line” to prevent contamination, mix-ups, and errors “10 or 20 years ago may be less than adequate by today’s standards.”
Id. This theoretical requirement for continuous improvement is heavily contradicted by both agency
and industry practice as described throughout this Article.
183
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 160. Procedural expenses are not unique to
the pharmaceutical industry, but are lower even in other closely-regulated industries. In the aeronautics industry, for example, producers of parts for airplanes must obtain Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) approval prior to manufacturing airplane parts. See 14 C.F.R. § 21 (2013). The FAA
must be notified of, and can review, any change in manufacturing procedure that could affect the airworthiness of a part. See, e.g., id. §§ 21.93–.97 (regarding approval of changes to type certificate); id.
§§ 21.139, 21.150, 21.309, 21.320, 21.609, 21.620 (regarding notification and review of changes in
manufacturing facilities or quality systems). Notification and review, however, do not require preapproval, thus reducing time and cost barriers.
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proval, so the path of innovation may be entirely foreclosed for drug manufacturers. In addition to the procedural barriers imposed by FDA regulations, the
regulations also create substantive barriers to manufacturing innovation.
b. Drug-Specific Substantive Barriers via Regulatory Lock-in
Substantive barriers to change privilege the status quo. These barriers revolve around a requirement for consistency with previously observed values,
instead of compliance with knowledge-based goals. Medications are approved
principally on the basis of clinical trials. 184 The FDA’s empirical approval of a
drug is based on clinical trials using that drug as it existed when used in the clinical trials. 185 For most drug characteristics, including those that do not affect
treatment outcomes or safety, whatever values may exist at the time of regulatory submission become the benchmark for measuring future drugs. 186 Specifications are set without justifying why they should have those values except that
those values worked in the relevant clinical trials. In the absence of sufficient
understanding, the positive becomes the normative through regulatory entrenchment.
The main implementation of this process is the batch-based generation of
drug quality specifications. For some drug attributes, like moisture content or
levels of impurities, the acceptable specification for the drug is determined by
testing three batches 187 of the drug as used for clinical testing. 188 Specifications
for the drug are set based on the average values and variability of those initial
184
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 25; Allison Stoddart, Note, Missing After
Mensing: A Remedy for Generic Drug Consumers, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (2012).
185
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 25.
186
See id. As one commentator has explained:

Too often in the past regulatory submission contained limited information concerning
the specific root causes of those conditions. As a result, these conditions became regulatory commitments and plant operators were expected to always reproduce exactly those
same sets of conditions. This type of operation can be considered a “static manufacturing operation” because it creates a mind-set that “product is approved and validated—
do not change.”
Id.

187
See supra notes 160–167 and accompanying text (explaining that manufacturers blindly and
detrimentally use three batches to follow an example provided in the 1987 FDA Guideline on General
Principles of Process Validation).
188
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: DISSOLUTION TESTING OF IMMEDIATE RELEASE SOLID ORAL DOSAGE FORMS 3, 5 (1997)
[hereinafter DISSOLUTION], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm070237.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A2AD-NCYW; see
also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: Q3A IMPURITIES IN NEW DRUG SUBSTANCES (2008) [hereinafter Q3A IMPURITIES], available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm127984.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/46SU-CTA4 (“The selection of impurities in a new drug substance specification should be
based on the impurities found in batches manufactured by the proposed commercial process.”).
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batches, and all future batches of the drug are required to meet those specifications. 189
For parameters where the industry and the FDA truly do not understand
what works and why, this valuation approach may make sense, but even in areas
where the relevant science is well understood, empiricism-based consistency still
controls. 190 Dissolution provides one central illustration. A drug’s dissolution
profile measures how fast the active ingredient releases from the drug product
(e.g., a tablet or capsule) and how fast the ingredient becomes soluble once released. 191 Dissolution profiles help determine how fast the drug will enter the
bloodstream. 192 Based on the empirical approach, the dissolution profile generated from testing initial drug batches is used to establish batch-to-batch consistency in ongoing manufacturing, as well as to evaluate manufacturing changes in
scale, site, component and composition, or equipment and process. 193 Any
change, and every batch, must match the specified dissolution profile to be approved. The empiricism-based consistency approach for dissolution, however,
fails to incorporate the well-developed understanding of differences in solubility
between different types of drugs. For highly soluble drugs, dissolving is easy and
therefore wide variation is likely to have no effect on the drug’s effectiveness
(i.e., some other step, like crossing the gastrointestinal wall, limits the rate of
drug action). 194 For low-solubility drugs, the dissolution rate may be crucial to
the drug’s performance. 195 Thus, tight manufacturing controls, although costly,
make sense for low-solubility drugs to ensure that dissolution profiles are very
similar to those of the clinically tested samples. But for highly soluble drugs,
where there is no reasonable expectation that even significant dissolution varia-

189
See DISSOLUTION, supra note 188, at 2 (“Once the specifications are established in an NDA,
the dissolution specifications for batch-to-batch quality assurance are published in the United States
Pharmacopeia (USP) as compendia standards, which become the official specifications for all subsequent IR products with the same active ingredients.”).
190
This system and its accompanying incentives may actively discourage the production of detailed drug knowledge, a question for future research.
191
See DISSOLUTION, supra note 188, at 1–2.
192
See id. Permeability through the walls of the gastrointestinal tract also significantly influences
how quickly an oral dosage form enters the bloodstream. See id. at 4.
193
Id. at 5, 8.
194
See Yu, supra note 62, at 783. One commentator notes that “current dissolution acceptance
limits are selected based on data from a small number of batches in the context of their ability to distinguish batches with limited regard to clinical relevance.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, under a
more rational approach, highly soluble drugs could have wide acceptance limits, whereas low solubility drugs may need closer examination in dissolution testing. Id.
195
See id. Regulators accept wider variation among highly soluble drugs; all of these drugs quickly react in the patient’s system, so variations—even wide variations—among dissolution rates are not
likely to affect how the drug reacts. See id. Conversely, for drugs that do not dissolve quickly, the
point of solubility in the patient is often critical for the drug to be effective, and thus, regulators do not
accept wide variation in these solubility rates. See id.
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bility would affect drug efficacy, 196 tight manufacturing controls stand in the
way of higher efficiency and other process innovations, without any corresponding health or safety benefit.
For this type of observationally determined parameter, FDA regulatory
oversight locks in the result of initial manufacturing techniques despite the fact
that most firms do not optimize the initial manufacturing batches used for clinical trials for efficient high-quality, large-scale production. 197 Instead, most firms
rush to produce clinical testing batches as fast as possible to speed drugs to market. 198 Manufacturing efficiency and controllability are accordingly given much
lower priority, and firms tend to avoid making significant investments in manufacturing process development at the stage when clinical trial supplies are being
produced. 199 Low rates of clinical trial success also lead to decreased investments in developing robust manufacturing understanding because firms typically
do not know early on whether a drug is likely to proceed to market. 200 Under the
traditional model, manufacturing process development thus happens during later
(Phase II or III) clinical trials—after most of the drug’s critical parameters have
already been largely determined and locked in by characterization of clinical trial
supplies. 201
Overall, regulation stunts innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In
other industries, regulation is aimed at well-understood quality goals, and manufacturers can innovate to reach or surpass those goals efficiently. 202 In pharmaceutical manufacturing, however, the quality goals are defined observationally,
on the basis of early, non-optimized manufacturing processes themselves. Thus,
regulations encourage pharmaceutical manufacturing to maintain the status quo
and prevent changes. Recent increased focus on quality regulations is likely to
exacerbate the problem. The Department of Justice has stated that it plans to take
an increased role in enforcing cGMP regulations. 203 The FDA stated in parallel
196

See id.
See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 80.
198
Id.
199
See REES, supra note 158, at 405–07. Recently, some companies have experimented with
developing manufacturing processes simultaneously with major clinical trials, but this requires significant expertise and resources generally available only to the largest pharmaceutical companies. Basu,
supra note 64, at 80. Process development has been estimated to account for as much as 15–30% of
R&D costs. Cox, supra note 78.
200
Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 711, 711 (2004).
201
AVELLANET, supra note 166, at 60. Under a Quality-by-Design (“QbD”) approach, discussed
in Part III, manufacturing methods should ideally be largely in place by Phase II. Id.; see infra notes
358–374 and accompanying text.
202
See Frimpong, supra note 109.
203
Id. Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, recognized
the relevant efficiency constraints: “We know, of course, that there are enormous pressures on all parts
of the industry to produce drugs more quickly, cheaply, and efficiently, and our message to you is that
you cannot sacrifice drug safety in service of these pressures.” Id.
197
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that it intended to make quality enforcement a major focus in 2013, even though
the agency had already stepped-up enforcement of cGMP and quality regulations
in the recent past. 204 Increased enforcement is likely to encourage risk-averse
adherence to old, approved processes rather than innovative change to newer,
more robust methods.
Regulatory hurdles alone, however, cannot fully explain manufacturing
stagnation because firms are able to overcome the tremendous regulatory hurdles
for getting drugs initially approved. The lack of innovation in pharmaceutical
manufacturing must also be attributed in large part to a lack of sufficient innovation incentives, whether sourced from regulatory exclusivity or from intellectual
property-based exclusivity.
B. Intellectual Property Incentives for Innovation
Innovation policy in the pharmaceutical industry, which has been shaped by
several Congressional acts, including the Hatch-Waxman Act, 205 focuses on
market exclusivity incentives for innovation in drug discovery and development.
Foremost in innovation policy is the patent system, but the pseudo-patent system
of FDA-administered statutory exclusivity is also used to augment and modify
drug patents. 206 These innovation incentives operate differently throughout the
various stages of drug development. Patents, although available throughout the
development process, are particularly prominent in protecting early investments. 207 Patents also play a strong role after approval in staving off generic
drug entry by preventing entry until the patents expire. Postapproval, patents
also protect drug innovations through “evergreening," a set of tactics used by
firms to extend effective patent protection on a drug. 208 FDA regulatory exclusivity, on the other hand, applies only later in the drug development process,
once the drug has already been approved and has entered the market. 209

204

Hamburg, supra note 112.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, & 35 U.S.C.).
206
See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm, archived at http://perma.
cc/74VG-2SNN (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). Although FDA-administered market- or data-exclusivity
are not typically considered intellectual property, this Article chooses to include them in this Section
nonetheless because they function similarly to create exclusivity incentives for innovation, even
though they lack some aspects of true intellectual property.
207
See E.W Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–69
(1977).
208
See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 354 & n.37; C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327,
327–28 (2012). Such strategies include obtaining patents on a drug’s specific ingredients, an intermediate product, or on new uses for the product. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 354.
209
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 366.
205
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In contrast to their role in drug discovery, patents and FDA regulatory exclusivity are not very effective at encouraging innovation in the field of pharmaceutical manufacturing. Because manufacturing process patents are hard to enforce, those patents involve an increased cost of disclosure coupled with a decreased exclusion benefit. 210 In addition, FDA regulatory exclusivity is unavailable for manufacturing innovations and thus plays no real role in incentivizing
such innovation. 211 As such, FDA regulatory exclusivity represents an opportunity for innovation policy. 212
Trade secrecy is significantly more important than patents and FDA regulatory exclusivity for manufacturing innovation. 213 Like patent or regulatory exclusivity, trade secrecy creates incentives for innovation by keeping others from
copying the innovation and therefore allowing supracompetitive pricing.214 Nevertheless, trade secrecy is not usually considered as a target for policy levers,
likely because the government has a relatively small role in maintaining trade
secrecy. Trade secrecy as the primary means of manufacturing innovation protection also causes other problems. In particular, the unique aspects of trade secrecy—including its practical limitations, an unbounded timeframe, processspecificity, and limitations on personnel—make it structurally less capable of
incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation. 215 In fact, the type of innovation most
needed in drug manufacturing—innovations reflecting greater understanding and
process knowledge—are particularly poorly suited to protection as trade secrets. 216
This Section shows that of the three main incentives for pharmaceutical innovation—patents, FDA market protection, and trade secrecy—only trade secre210

See infra notes 235–247 and accompanying text (discussing how process patents’ costs often
outweigh their benefits).
211
See infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no FDA market exclusivity for manufacturing innovations).
212
See infra notes 419–425 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of creating a regulatory exclusivity regime for manufacturing innovation).
213
Cf. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 34 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552, archived at http://perma.cc/JW7AEL2W. According to a 1994 survey of the industry, pharmaceutical firms reported that 68% of process
innovations could be effectively protected by secrecy, but only 36% by patents. Id. For products, the
fractions were much closer at 54% and 50%, respectively. Id. at 33 tbl.1. This presumably refers to
secrecy protection in the earlier stages of drug development, because drug details are public by the
time a drug is marketed. See Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for
Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 613 (2001).
214
See infra notes 223–283 and accompanying text (discussing patent and FDA market exclusivity in the pharmaceutical market).
215
See infra notes 326–331 and accompanying text (noting the structural shortcomings of a trade
secrecy regime).
216
See infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (analyzing trade secrets in pharmaceutical
manufacturing).
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cy seems to play a major role in encouraging innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing. 217 But trade secrecy is flawed as an innovation motivator, at least in
this context, because it lacks the temporal limitations of either the patent system
or FDA market protection. 218 Trade secrecy also restricts socially useful disclosure, largely preventing cumulative innovation, which is central to major advances. 219 Trade secrecy is also least amenable to policy manipulation, as it has
little to no government involvement. In sum, in the current system, there is scant
intellectual property policy encouraging innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing.
Subsection 1 describes patent law, including the shortcomings and benefits
of process patents for manufacturing processes and the safe harbor provision of
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 220 Subsection 2 discusses FDA regulatory exclusivity
and its failure to incentivize manufacturing innovation. 221 Finally, Subsection 3
analyzes trade secrets and how trade secrecy encourages innovation but suffers
severe drawbacks as well. 222
1. Patents
Patents reward invention by allowing the inventor to recoup high up-front
costs through a temporary monopoly and correspondingly high prices. In addition, the patent system requires public disclosure of the knowledge created by
the inventor. 223 This disclosure is “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”224
Disclosure not only allows the eventual use of the innovation by the public, but
also permits other innovators to use the disclosed information for their own innovations. 225 The patent monopoly lasts twenty years from the time of filing. 226
During that time, the patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention. 227 The pharmaceutical industry is a clear
217

See infra notes 223–331 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 326–331 and accompanying text (explaining that innovation secrecy across the
industry hinders continual innovation).
219
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 229,
229–32 (2000); Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 32–33.
220
See infra notes 223–269 and accompanying text.
221
See infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text.
222
See infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text.
223
See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
224
Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).
225
See Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 31. Trade secret law, to the contrary, neither requires nor
allows disclosure of the innovation to the public. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985) (defining
“trade secret” as information . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable . . . and (ii) is the subject of
efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy”); see infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (explaining that a
lack of disclosure in a trade secrecy regime prevents continual innovation).
226
35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2013).
227
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
218
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outlier in the extent to which patents help drive and shape R&D investment and
innovation in developing new drugs. 228 Both composition of matter patents on
drugs and method patents, the latter of which cover the treatment uses of the
drug, are important to drug innovation. Composition patents are more valuable
because a patent on the drug’s active ingredient allows the patentee to exclude
others from making, selling, or using the drug for any use, even those uses not
specifically envisioned by the patentee. 229
In striking contrast, patents do little to stimulate manufacturing innovation.
Patents on manufacturing processes, 230 which cover using the processes in the
United States or importing products made with the processes, 231 exist in the
pharmaceutical industry but are less valuable and less common than other forms
of pharmaceutical patents. 232 Patents fail to drive manufacturing innovation for
228

Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, 4 ANN.
REV. ECON. 541, 548 (2012) (describing a survey that found that patents effectively increase innovation primarily in the pharmaceutical industry); see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An
Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 173, 175 tbl.1, 175–76 n.8 (1986) (noting that about 65% of
pharmaceutical inventions would not have been introduced into the market absent patent protection,
whereas no office equipment, motor vehicle, rubber, or textile innovations would have failed to be
introduced); B.N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503,
545–56 (2008) (describing the pharmaceutical industry’s unique dependence on patent protection to
spur R&D investment).
229
Andrew Chadeayne, Composition of Matter Claims, CHADEAYNE, LLC, http://inventing
patents.com/composition-matter-claims/, archived at http://perma.cc/6KF5-PDFQ (last visited Feb.
15, 2014). For example, Minoxidil, sold as Rogaine to treat male pattern baldness, was originally
developed and sold by Pharmacia and Upjohn to treat high blood pressure. The initial patent on
Minoxidil, U.S. Patent No. 3,461,461 (filed Nov. 1, 1965), covered both the compound itself and a
method of using it to treat high blood pressure. A later patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug.
19, 1977), covered the method of using Minoxidil to stimulate hair growth. Until the ’461 patent on
Minoxidil itself expired, Pharmacia could prevent others from making or selling Minoxidil, and the
FDA would not approve any generic version. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). Once the ’461 patent
expired, generic companies could apply to sell generic versions of Minoxidil to treat high blood pressure—which could then be prescribed for any purpose, including treating baldness. See id.
230
Manufacturing innovation can be protected by process patents on a novel process or by product patents on, for instance, a new piece of equipment. This Article focuses on process patents because
they face unique enforcement problems. Equipment patents may help drive innovation in producing
that equipment, but the substantial absence of manufacturing innovation suggests these patents are
insufficient to drive manufacturing innovation.
231
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Merely using the process abroad does not infringe the patent. See id.
Products made abroad using a U.S.-patented process may also be subject to an exclusion order by the
U.S. International Trade Commission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
232
See Jeffrey I.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 23–37 (2002) (describing how process patent costs outweigh their benefits); see also Cohen et al., supra note 213, at
33–34 tbls.1 & 2 (reporting 1994 survey results showing that pharmaceutical firms considered secrecy
effective for 68% of process innovations). But see Mark E. Wojcik, The Perilous Process of Protecting
Process Patents from Infringing Importations, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 207, 210 (1992) (noting that “[i]nventors of new drugs created from chemical processes often seek to patent not only the
drugs themselves, but the way in which they are produced, in order to secure ‘double’ patent protection”).
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two reasons: they have structural cost-benefit problems, 233 and, more recently,
they may be unavailable for certain important types of manufacturing innovation. 234
a. Process Patents’ High Costs and Low Benefits
Process patents’ cost-benefit problems prevent these patents from meaningfully incentivizing manufacturing innovation. Process patents’ costs are too high,
and their benefits are too low. The costs are too high because manufacturers do
not want to give up their competitive advantage by publicly disclosing their processes. 235 Because processes are hard to observe and hard to determine from the
final product, reverse-engineering manufacturing processes is particularly difficult. Thus, in the absence of disclosure, competitors must independently develop
the innovation themselves.
Process patents’ benefits are low because they are very hard to enforce. 236
First, process patents are usually easier to invent around than product patents
because infringing a process patent requires performing every step of the process. 237 Thus, competitors have more opportunities for variation to escape patent
coverage. 238 In addition, determining infringement can be particularly challenging because “no one outside the potential infringer knows how the product was
made.” 239 Identifying the manufacturing process from examination of the final
product is likely even more difficult for especially valuable general manufacturing methods patents (e.g., methods for performing real-time analysis of production dynamics) compared to product-specific patents (e.g., a method for producing a water-soluble version of the nutritional supplement creatine). 240
Once suit has been brought, proving infringement is facilitated by a statutory rebuttable presumption of infringement upon a showing “(1) that a substantial
likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented process, and (2) that
233

See infra notes 235–247 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 248–269 and accompanying text.
235
See Girish Malhotra, Are Patents a Double-edged Sword? Perspective Matters., PROFITABILITY THROUGH SIMPLICITY (Feb. 8, 2011, 7:37 AM), http://pharmachemicalscoatings.blogspot.com/
2011/02/are-patents-double-edged-sword.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U56G-UFB3.
236
See Lewis & Cody, supra note 232, at 23–37 (discussing the difficulties of bringing process
patent suits, and in particular, noting that courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who
fail to take reasonable steps to determine infringement and laborious investigative steps to support
process infringement lawsuits).
237
See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–07 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
238
Id. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 213, at 47 fig.6 (reporting that in a 1994 crossindustry survey, the ability to invent around a patent was one of the most important reasons that firms
chose not to patent demonstrably novel innovations).
239
Lewis & Cody, supra note 232, at 7. Identifying international infringement may be particularly
challenging. Id. at 9.
240
Cf. Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(discussing a suit involving a product-specific patent and the hurdles to uncovering such processes).
234
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the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process actually used
in the production of the product and was unable to so determine.” 241 Nonetheless, as with identifying infringement, demonstrating a “substantial likelihood”
of infringement is likely harder with general than with specific techniques.
For biological manufacturing processes, patent protection strategies may
differ because manufacturing methods are unusually central for biologics. 242
Even more so than for small-molecule drugs, the manufacturing complexity and
development costs for biologics can serve as a potent barrier to entry, keeping
competitors off the market. 243 Thus, the public disclosure required by a patent
can lower that entry barrier by providing information about both the biologicspecific manufacturing process and general manufacturing processes for biologics, making patents particularly unattractive. Despite the risks of disclosure,
some firms pursue process patents. 244 For example, AbbVie has around 200
manufacturing patents protecting the production of Humira, a biologic with over
$10 billion in yearly sales used to treat arthritis, 245 and intends to use them to

241

35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006); see Creative Compounds, 651 F.3d at 1315. “Substantial likelihood”
is described in one Senate Judiciary Committee report as “less than that of proving successfully at trial
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a product in question was in fact made by the patented
process[,] but . . . more than a slight possibility that the product was so made.” See JOE BIDEN, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON THE PROCESS PATENTS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1989, S. REP. NO.
100-83, at 45 (1987). If both conditions found in § 295 are met, the burden shifts to the accused infringer to prove noninfringement. Creative Compounds, 651 F.3d at 1314–15 (“Because the accused
infringer is in a far better position to determine the actual manufacturing process than the patentee,
fairness dictates that the accused, likely the only party able to obtain this information, reveal this process or face the presumption of infringement.” (citing Lewis & Cody, supra note 232, at 22–23)).
Although § 295 applies to both foreign and domestic manufacturing, domestic manufacturers can
likely determine the process used. See S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 45. According to the Senate Judiciary
Committee report:
The rebuttable presumption would be inapplicable if the defendant has used the process
in the United States . . . . In these circumstances, the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the equitable powers of Federal courts should be sufficient
to allow the plaintiff to ascertain what process was employed.
Id.

242
A comprehensive analysis of manufacturing patent strategy differences must await future
work. An additional important element in biologic patent strategy comes from the differences in patent-challenge procedures for small-molecule drugs and for biologics. For a detailed explanation, see
generally Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-On Biologics Law: A Section by Section Analysis of
the Patent Litigation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231 (2010).
243
See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of biologics manufacturing).
244
This may be especially true for previously known biologics, which are for ineligible patent
protection as compositions of matter. Manufacturing process patents provide at least some protection.
245
Christopher Weaver et al., Biotech Drugs Still Won’t Copy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2013, 7:25
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323864304578318111144984632.
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extend its market exclusivity period past the 2016 expiration of Humira’s primary compound patents. 246
Overall, patents on manufacturing innovation fail to reward manufacturing
innovation adequately. This inadequacy stems from a combination of enforcement difficulties and the problem of disclosing innovative manufacturing methods to competitors. 247 Firms that do not pursue process patents apparently value
the cost of the disclosure as more significant than the speculative benefits to be
gained from enforcing process patents.
b. The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
Despite the structural problems, at least some manufacturing process patents are worth pursuing. But many of these patents have recently been made
less valuable because of a likely unintended quirk of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which essentially renders unenforceable a class of patents covering techniques
central to modernizing manufacturing. 248
In authorizing a generic drug approval pathway, the Act created a safe harbor exemption for drugs: it is not an infringing act to use a patented invention
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products.” 249 The safe harbor was enacted to allow
generic drug companies (and now, biosimilar companies) to develop products,
along with the required comparability and safety information, before the expiration of the pioneer company’s patent. 250 The safe harbor allows generic firms to
win approval and be ready to market the drug as soon as the pioneer’s patents (or
market exclusivity periods) expire.
246

Id.
See supra notes 235–246 and accompanying text. An additional lessening of economic incentives may occur from a timing mismatch. For manufacturing methods developed by an innovator firm
later in the course of drug development or after the drug has been approved, the value of the innovation is lessened because innovator’s market share of the drug drops sharply on generic entry after
expiration of the principal drug patents. This is especially true in the absence of a well-functioning
licensing regime, as the innovator firm will be unable to license the innovation to other manufacturing
firms and thus cannot capture that potential value.
248
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (providing that there is no patent infringement for utilization
of a manufacturing process done “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products”).
249
Id.
250
See id.; Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1354–56 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013). “Biosimilars” are products that are highly similar to a biological product that has already received FDA approval. Biosimilars, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approval
applications/therapeuticbiologicapplications/biosimilars/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/D8HY5DZ4 (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
247
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The techniques potentially implicated by the safe harbor are central to
modern manufacturing. These techniques are especially important for biosimilars because biosimilars require extensive analytical testing to demonstrate biosimilarity. 251 To the extent that patent protection for such techniques could provide innovation incentives, those incentives were recently weakened.
In 2012, in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction against a generic company because the generic’s use of a pioneer’s patented technology to prepare submissions to the FDA before the patent’s expiration fell within the Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provision.252 Momenta involved
the making of a generic version of Lovenox (enoxaparin), a hard-to-specify mixture of different-length sugar chains made by Aventis and used to treat blood
clots. 253 The FDA established five analytically complex and technically challenging “standards for identity” to establish that “generic enoxaparin has the ‘same’
active ingredient as Lovenox.”254 Momenta 255 and Amphastar both filed ANDAs
for generic versions of enoxaparin. 256 Momenta’s application was approved
first 257—an approval worth over $1 billion annually when Momenta’s was the
only approved generic. 258
Two days after Amphastar’s ANDA was approved, Momenta sued Amphastar for infringing its patent, which claimed “methods for analyzing heterogeneous populations of sulfated polysaccharides, e.g. heparin [and enoxaparin].” 259 Such methods were largely described in and required by one of the
FDA’s “standards for identity.”260 Momenta alleged that Amphastar was infringing its patent by using the claimed method to show that each commercial batch
251

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERADEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 8–12 (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM2
91128.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3ESZ-QGYY (providing guidance and outlining the specific
and somewhat arduous process of demonstrating biosimilarity).
252
686 F.3d at 1349–52, 1361.
253
Id. at 1349–50.
254
Id. at 1350.
255
Momenta partnered with Sandoz, Inc., (collectively “Momenta”) for this joint venture. Id. at
1351.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
U.S. Patent No. 7,575,886 col. 4 II. 53–55 (filed Mar. 11, 2003); see Momenta Pharm., 686
F.3d at 1351.
260
Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1350–52. See generally Letter from Douglas Throckmorton, Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Peter O. Safir and Scott L. Cunningham, Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 17–18 (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Drug
Safety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM220083.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/M5HJ-XAEZ (applying the FDA’s five-part test for identity and denying most of Aventis’s
petition that the FDA deny approval of any generic versions of Lovenox).
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of its generic enoxaparin was bioequivalent to Lovenox. 261 The district court
preliminarily enjoined Amphastar from using the technology. 262
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the safe harbor covers
using patents to generate information for submission pursuant to drug-regulating
laws, whether that submission is for initial approval or related to ongoing manufacturing. 263 In fact, the information need never be submitted to the FDA, as
long as it is “reasonably related” to such a submission. 264 FDA regulations require that records associated with a produced batch of drugs be retained for at
least a year after the batch’s expiration date and be “readily available for authorized inspection” at any time. 265 The court held that under these regulations, Amphastar’s use of the batch testing data in this case was “reasonably related” to a
submission and therefore fell under the safe harbor. 266
Modern manufacturing will require increasing amounts of in-line testing,
examination of complex product characteristics, and analytical “fingerprinting”
techniques. 267 These methods are neither simple nor cheap to develop and are
relatively easy to copy once known, so they are paradigm cases for intellectual
property. But the current legal regime removes both major policy sources of innovation incentives for developing such techniques. First, the FDA publishes
manufacturing testing details within standards for demonstrating bioequivalence
or biosimilarity, eliminating the possibility of keeping the process as a trade secret. Second, the safe harbor—as interpreted in Momenta—essentially eliminates
the reward of a patent-protected monopoly. A vigorous dissent from Chief Judge
Randall Rader recognized the expansion of the safe harbor as innovation-stifling,
describing the decision as “an undeserved victory for those who decline to invest
in the expense and difficulty of discovery and invention.” 268
Momenta will likely have two effects on patent-based innovation incentives
under the current regime: (1) decreased investment in manufacturing-diagnostic
innovation; and (2) attempts to disclose the bare minimum of information to the
FDA necessary for approval, with the goal of making it more difficult to copy
261

Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1352.
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 184, 199 (D. Mass. 2011).
263
Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1354, 1361.
264
Id. at 1357.
265
21 C.F.R. § 211.180(c) (2013); see Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1357.
266
Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1353, 1358. The court distinguished its 2011 decision Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, which held that the safe harbor does not extend to “information
that may be routinely reported to the FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained,” 659
F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011), by noting that Amphastar’s test batch data “is necessary both to the
continued approval of the ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug.” Momenta Pharm., 686
F.3d at 1353, 1358. The court also held that the FDA requires Amphastar to use the patented method to
batch-test its enoxaparin for conformity with the identity standards. Id. at 1361.
267
See Yves Roggo et al., A Review of Near Infrared Spectroscopy and Chemometrics in Pharmaceutical Technologies, 44 J. PHARMACEUTICAL & BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS 683, 687 (2007).
268
Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting).
262
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the novel techniques. 269 These effects hurt innovation with two consequences.
First, innovation in real-time and complex analytical monitoring of manufacturing is crucial for making modern manufacturing more streamlined and efficient
and for obtaining the twin goals of increasing quality while reducing costs. Second, this type of innovation is likely central for driving forward industry-wide
improvements based both on wider adoption and on incremental improvements
from the initial innovation.
Overall, process patents on manufacturing techniques are poorly suited to
drive innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In addition to the patents’
basic structural problems of high disclosure costs and challenging enforcement,
the safe harbor further reduces the enforceability of continuous monitoring and
other evaluative method process patents.
2. FDA-Mediated Market Protection
The second major locus of innovation policy in the pharmaceutical industry
lies with the FDA. For drug products, the FDA is statutorily authorized to grant
periods of market protection—market or data exclusivity—parallel to the patent
system. 270 This protection can be granted as a reward for winning approval for a
new chemical entity, 271 a treatment for a rare disease, 272 or a new indication.273
Protection can also be granted for conducting pediatric studies. 274 Since 2010,
biologics have similar periods of market protection. 275 In addition to pioneers,
protection is also available for some first-approved generics 276 or interchangea-

269

Judging Momenta on the merits and prognosticating its effects on biosimilar development are
both outside the scope of this Article.
270
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E) (2012). This exclusivity can be market exclusivity, in which the
FDA withholds approval from competitors, or data exclusivity, in which competitors cannot rely on
the innovator’s data and must spend large sums to generate their own. Though these two types of
exclusivity are legally and conceptually distinct, their basic effect—to provide a large and valuable
innovation incentive—is the same. Accordingly, this Article conflates the two forms under the term
“market protection.”
271
See id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (granting five years of market exclusivity for new chemical entities
not previously approved for any indication by the FDA).
272
See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2012) (granting seven years of market exclusivity for drugs targeting rare diseases that affect fewer than 200,000 patients in the United States).
273
See id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (granting three years for product changes requiring new clinical
trials, including switching to over-the-counter status or adding a new dosage form).
274
See id. § 355a(b) (granting six months of additional exclusivity for conducting pediatric trials,
which need not be limited to pediatric uses).
275
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013) (granting four years of market exclusivity and an additional eight years of data exclusivity). The twelve-year exclusivity period granted by
§ 262 does not apply to relatively minor changes to an approved biologic. Id. Furthermore, an additional six months may be added based on the performance of pediatric studies. Id. § 262(m).
276
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
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ble biosimilars. 277 This “pseudo-patent” market protection, when in force, may
even be more valuable than a patent because it is government-enforced and essentially unchallengeable. Conversely, patents require expensive private enforcement and are subject to legal challenge.278 FDA market exclusivity also has
various other benefits for pioneer companies. 279
The FDA’s market protection regime creates incentives to not only discover
new drugs but also to generate valuable information about drug efficacy through
expensive and risky clinical trials. 280 This information is socially valuable but
costly for firms to generate, and firms are unable to capture much of the information’s value. 281 The FDA promotes information creation through its initial
market approval process, where approval is indication specific, and through its
prohibition on industry promotion of off-label uses without adequate supporting
clinical information. 282
Despite the power of the FDA’s innovation incentives, however, the incentives focus exclusively on the process of bringing individual drugs to market.
Even those provisions that take effect after the initial market approval (for example, exclusivity for changes requiring clinical trials or for pediatric trials) focus on preapproval-type information and activities, such as verifying the safety
and efficacy of the drug. FDA exclusivity incentives do not exist for manufacturing innovation. Rather, the only FDA-mediated manufacturing incentives appear
to be the ability to avoid the costs of quality failures and plant shutdowns due to
the FDA’s regulatory oversight. 283
3. Trade Secrets
Instead of patents or FDA market protection, trade secret protection
grounded in state law is likely the most valuable form of intellectual property or

277

See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (granting exclusivity for twelve to forty-two months, during which
no other interchangeable product can enter the market).
278
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 364–66.
279
Id. at 362–66.
280
Id. at 370.
281
See id.
282
Id. The FDA’s ability to prohibit off-label marketing has come under serious question. Cf.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). In the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case Sorrell
v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court held that pharmaceutical marketing is “a form of expression protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.” Id. And in 2012, the Second Circuit held that the
FDA’s prohibition on truthful speech by pharmaceutical companies about off-label use of FDAapproved products violates the First Amendment. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–69 (2d
Cir. 2012).
283
See generally supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of recent contamination events).
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exclusivity incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturing. 284 Trade secret law provides protection from misappropriation of information that is reasonably kept
secret and derives value from its secrecy. 285 Trade secrets play a bigger role in
protecting manufacturing processes for at least three reasons. First, enforcing
manufacturing process patents is difficult, whereas the effectiveness of trade secrets—as long as they can be kept secret—does not depend on monitoring other
firms’ activities. 286 Second, trade secrets, by definition, do not require disclosure
of information to competitors, which may be broadly useful. Finally, trade secrets, unlike patents or statutory exclusivity, do not have a predetermined
lifespan; they may continue indefinitely. Given these advantages, trade secrets
have long been important to protecting manufacturing processes, and are increasingly so. 287 Although reported cases are relatively rare, they provide illustrative examples of the possible roles trade secrets can play in manufacturing
innovation. 288
Trade secrets can protect innovation and consequently provide an incentive
to innovate in multiple ways. At one extreme, a well-protected trade secret on an
essential manufacturing technique can completely prevent market entry by competitors and thereby allow monopoly pricing with no predetermined time limit.
Trade secrets on manufacturing improvements can also allow competitive cost
advantages that change market contours. These scenarios are described below in
Subsection 3.a. 289 Like manufacturing patents, however, trade secrets can be
hard to enforce, though in different ways. For example, the same secrecy that
keeps the innovator company’s intellectual property secret can render the misappropriator’s use of the secret difficult to detect. Similarly, this secrecy can make
it hard to determine whether the second firm in fact misappropriated the trade
secret or just discovered it independently. These difficulties are described below
in Subsection 3.b. 290 And even if trade secrets provide some functional incentive
to innovate, they create other difficulties both for the innovation process within a
284
Telephone Interview with Geoffrey Levitt, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
Pfizer (Nov. 29, 2012); see supra notes 223–283 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings
of patent and FDA market exclusivity in promoting manufacturing innovation).
285
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
286
See John Avellanet, Securing Intellectual Property from the Inside Out, in BEST PRACTICES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT: VALUATION, LICENSING, CASH FLOW, PHARMACOECONOMICS, MARKET SELECTION, COMMUNICATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 37, 37 (Yali Friedman ed., 2008).
287
Robert Graham Gibbons & Bryan J. Vogel, The Increasing Importance of Trade Secret Protection in the Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Fields, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 261, 262 (2007).
288
There are relatively few reported cases about pharmaceutical trade secrets. It is unclear whether this comes from a low frequency of trade secrets, trade secret misappropriations, litigation of discovered misappropriations to judgment, or some combination.
289
See infra notes 292–309 and accompanying text.
290
See infra notes 310–325 and accompanying text.
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firm and for the spread of social benefits from innovation. These structural
weaknesses of a trade secret regime are discussed below in Subsection 3.c. 291
a. Monopoly Maintenance by Excluding Competitors
Trade secrets may provide innovators with an indefinite monopoly, thus allowing pioneers to earn extensive supracompetitive revenues. One case that illuminates both the indefinite duration of trade secrets and the difficulty of replicating essential manufacturing techniques is the drug Premarin. In 2003, in Wyeth v. Natural Biologics, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
permanently enjoined Natural Biologics from using Wyeth’s unpatented estrogen
removal process (the “Brandon Process”) to make generic Premarin because
Natural Biologics misappropriated the process in violation of Minnesota’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 292 Wyeth manufactures Premarin for the treatment of
symptoms associated with menopause and sells over $1 billion in Premarin yearly. 293
Premarin is a product of natural conjugated estrogens made from the urine
of pregnant mares (“PMU”) and has been marketed without any natural generic
substitute since 1942. 294 Synthetic estrogens exist, but are not FDA-approved as
generic substitutes for naturally derived Premarin. 295 No competitor has entered
the market, however, primarily because of the difficulty in extracting the estrogens. 296
Wyeth extracts and purifies the estrogens at a plant in Brandon, Manitoba,
using the Brandon Process that Wyeth claimed as a trade secret. 297 Wyeth obtained several early patents on methods connected with estrogen extraction research. 298 These patents, however, provided insufficient information to recreate

291

See infra notes 326–331 and accompanying text.
Wyeth v. Natural Biologics, Inc., No. Civ. 98-2469, 2003 WL 22282371, at *18–19, *27–29
(D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2003), aff’d, 395 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2005). See generally MINN. STAT. § 325C.01
(2013).
293
Id. at *1, *2.
294
Id. at *1. Premarin was approved as a drug under the Food Drug, and Cosmetics Act, rather
than as a biologic under the Public Health Services Act, which had not yet been enacted. Accordingly,
generic versions could be approved via the ANDA process.
295
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Generic Premarin (May 5, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/Post
marketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfes
sionals/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucm169045.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ZJ7P-STXX. The FDA
decided not to approve synthetic estrogens as generic Premarin because the role of the various estrogens found in Premarin are not fully understood. See id. Premarin was approved before requirements
for comprehensive analysis became a prerequisite for marketing approval. See id.
296
See Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1.
297
Id. at *2.
298
Id.
292

2014]

Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

535

the Brandon Process, which is unpatented. 299 Wyeth took several measures to
ensure the secrecy of the Brandon Process. 300 In fact, the Brandon Process was
not written down from 1966, when the plant opened, until 1979, when regulations required the drafting of formal operating procedures. 301
Several major companies attempted to duplicate Wyeth’s success by extracting estrogens from PMU. 302 All failed. 303 The only other company to successfully extract estrogens, Natural Biologics, did so by acquiring the details of
the Brandon Process from a research chemist who had consulted for Wyeth. 304
Natural Biologics had previously failed in its attempts to recreate the Brandon
Process by using information from the expired patents as well as manifests of the
Brandon plant’s waste chemicals. 305 On learning of Natural Biologics’s plans to
extract estrogens using Wyeth’s Brandon Process, Wyeth sued for misappropriation of trade secrets. The district court found misappropriation of trade secrets
and a resulting likelihood of hundreds of millions of dollars in decreased revenues and R&D investments for Wyeth if Natural Biologics were to bring generic
Premarin onto the market. 306 The court permanently enjoined Natural Biologics
from researching or developing any methods for extracting estrogens from urine
or manufacturing any such estrogens. 307
Wyeth’s trade secret of the precise manufacturing technique for Premarin
illustrates how trade secrets can thwart the intentions of patent law, create
deadweight social loss, and hold back manufacturing innovation. The patent bargain is the disclosure of useful information to the public in exchange for a limited period of monopoly pricing to recoup the costs of developing the information. 308 But here, although Wyeth was granted several patents on Premarin—
including patents specifically on techniques for extracting estrogens from
urine—those patents did not disclose enough information for other firms to recreate Premarin once the patents had expired. 309 Accordingly, Wyeth was able to
maintain its monopoly pricing for far longer than the term envisioned by the patent bargain—over seventy years—causing deadweight loss to society well past
299

Id. Wyeth’s estrogen extraction patents included, among others, U.S. Patent No. 2,429,398
(filed May 23, 1944); U.S. Patent No. 2,551,205 (filed Oct. 1, 1947); U.S. Patent No. 2,696,265 (filed
Dec. 11, 1948); and U.S. Patent No. 2,834,712 (filed May 27, 1953). Id. The ’712 patent expired in
May 1975. Id.
300
Id. at *3–5.
301
Id. at *3.
302
Id. at *9.
303
Id.
304
Id. at *6–10.
305
Id. at *5–6.
306
Id. at *18, *21.
307
Id. at *25–28.
308
Hall & Harhoff, supra note 228, at 542. See generally supra notes 223–225 and accompanying
text (discussing patent disclosure requirements).
309
See Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1.
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the time needed to recoup development costs. Finally, whatever the secret manufacturing method is for making Premarin, that method must lack new innovation.
The FDA defines Premarin by its process, and that definition has not changed
and, in fact, cannot change. In addition, no other firms have been able to innovate cumulatively based on the Brandon Process. No other firms can improve the
process of extracting estrogens from PMU, which could potentially lead to better
drugs. And no firm can apply the knowledge embodied in that process to developing other processes, whether related to hormones, other drugs, or other fields
entirely. Thus, although a monopoly protected by trade secrecy is certainly a potent incentive for some manufacturing innovation, the secrecy also impedes other innovation.
b. Non-Monopoly Incentives and Enforcement Challenges
Not all trade secrets completely enforce a monopoly. One case involving
veterinary penicillin 310 demonstrates the competitive cost advantage incentives
of an innovative manufacturing technique, but also illustrates the challenges of
enforcing trade secrets, which limits trade secrecy’s use as innovation drivers.
In 2003, in Norbrook Laboratories Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Manufacturing
Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York held that Hanford misappropriated Norbrook’s manufacturing method for producing veterinary penicillin and permanently enjoined Hanford from using the method. 311
Norbrook developed a method of manufacturing veterinary penicillin by conducting the final manufacturing reaction in situ without having to dry the intermediate product. 312 The method was technically challenging but resulted in tremendous cost savings. The raw materials for the conventional method, which
required drying, cost about $56 per kilogram, but the raw materials for the novel
method cost only $9 per kilogram. 313 The new method was sufficiently different
that the FDA deemed it a radical shift from the normal method recognized by the
USP and required that the method be separately approved. 314 Eventually, Norbrook persuaded both the USP and the FDA to approve its in situ method. 315 Af310

Norbrook Labs. Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 463 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 483–90, 492–93.
312
Id. at 469–71. Because the final product is a suspension, the penicillin particles suspended in
the injection volume must be small enough to avoid clumping and causing pain when injected, but
large enough to stay suspended. Id. at 468. In the conventional method, two early reagents are mixed,
sterilized, filtered, dried, and milled to small particles by a third party; the powder is then sold to the
primary manufacturer for assembly into a final dosage form. Id. In the in situ method, the primary
manufacturer mixes the early reagents itself and “wet”-mills the product, without filtering or drying,
into the final dosage form. Id. at 468–69. Cost savings come from avoiding drying time and avoiding
the need for a third-party supplier of the intermediate product. Id.
313
Id. at 469.
314
See id. at 471.
315
Id.
311
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ter approval, the “significant cost advantages” from the new process allowed
Norbrook to acquire most of its competitor Hanford’s customers and make significant inroads into the U.S. market for veterinary penicillin. 316
The process was so market-changing that Hanford hired Dr. Quinn, the scientist who had invented Norbrook’s procedure, and who had subsequently left
Norbrook and signed a confidentiality agreement, and induced him to share
Norbrook’s trade secret manufacturing innovation. 317 Once Hanford had acquired the details of Norbrook’s in situ manufacturing process, Hanford was able
to implement the process rapidly, without any major changes, and received FDA
approval almost immediately. 318
The details of Norbrook’s discovery of Hanford’s misappropriation illuminate how trade secrecy functions, and fails, in pharmaceutical manufacturing.
Norbrook discovered Hanford’s misappropriation essentially by happenstance,
not by any monitoring program or FDA notification. After Dr. Quinn left Norbrook, Norbrook sued him in Northern Ireland for unrelated defamation. 319 In
discovery, Norbrook uncovered the contacts between Hanford and Dr. Quinn
during a deposition of Hanford’s CEO. 320 Norbrook made a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the FDA, asking whether Hanford had sought
approval to modify its penicillin manufacturing process since Hanford had hired
Dr. Quinn. 321 The FDA provided a heavily redacted document. 322 Norbrook investigated further and eventually concluded that Hanford had applied for approval to change from conventional to in situ manufacturing. 323 Thereafter, Norbrook sent a cease-and-desist letter to Hanford and then initiated its suit for misappropriation of trade secrets. 324 In the end, the district court found misappropriation of trade secrets and preliminarily enjoined Hanford from using or publishing Norbrook’s in situ process. 325
Norbrook’s trade secret thus allows it a significant and continuing market
advantage, acting as an incentive for the earlier innovation. This case, however,
316

Id. at 473.
Id. at 474–79.
318
Id. at 477–79.
319
Id. at 472. Dr. Quinn had republished a press release by Senator Chuck Schumer, which referenced an FDA investigation into alleged impurities in Norbrook’s veterinary penicillin. Id. at 469,
472. Norbrook had also separately sued Dr. Quinn twice for other breaches of his contractual confidentiality obligations; neither breach was related to the in situ technology. Id.
320
Id. at 469, 472.
321
Id. at 469. See generally Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (requiring agencies to make available certain information to the public); id. § 552(a)(3)(A) (creating a formal requestand-response process); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 196–200
(2013) (discussing FOIA).
322
Norbrook Labs, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 469
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id. at 489–94.
317

Boston College Law Review

538

[Vol. 55:491

also exemplifies the difficulties of protecting manufacturing processes. Both
Norbrook’s discovery that Hanford was using its protected process and its correct inference of trade secret misappropriation were fortuitous. In many cases,
such facts remain undiscovered, rendering trade secrecy’s incentive less certain.
c. Structural Problems with Trade Secrets as Innovation Incentives
As described above, trade secrets have some advantages for firms over patents; assuming they can be protected, they are indefinite and do not demand
disclosure to the public and competitors. Even well-functioning trade secrets,
however, have serious problems when viewed from the standpoint of innovation
policy. 326 First, as long as secrecy is maintained, which may be indefinitely, no
other firms—competitors or not—can benefit from the innovation, and society
cannot benefit from any cumulative innovation based on the secret. 327 A tremendous amount of innovation is cumulative, and a large portion of cumulative innovation is made by firms other than the first innovator. 328
Second, the secrecy measures necessary to protect trade secrets may hinder
initial innovation even within a firm. To increase secrecy, the trade secret will
almost certainly be kept from many individuals at the firm, including other innovators. 329 Even for those who have some access to the information, protection of
trade secrets demands compartmentalization and separation of information so
that the information needed for an entire protected process cannot easily be misappropriated. 330 Thus, very few people even within the firm can build on the innovation.
326

For a more thorough treatment of problems with trade secrecy as an innovation regime, see
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 241, 264–70 (1998), which argues that trade secrets’ costs cannot be justified because innovations are already adequately protected by patent, copyright, trademark, contract, and criminal law.
Contra Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 328–32 (2008) (addressing Bone’s article and arguing that trade secrets should be understood as IP rights because they act like patents and copyrights by encouraging innovation through
exclusivity and the promise of supracompetitive profits).
327
See Nisvan Erkal, The Decision to Patent, Cumulative Innovation, and Optimal Policy, 23
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 535, 536–38 (2005).
328
See Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 29–32.
329
Cf. Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *3 (noting that the manufacturing process at issue in Wyeth
was in use since 1966 but was not written down until 1979).
330
See AVELLANET, supra note 166, at 149. According to one set of recommendations regarding
best practices for trade secret-related standard operating procedures (“SOPs”):
One way to compartmentalize and separate information is to eliminate any intellectual
property that reveals step-by-step details of a process. For a formulation, firms might
leave out specific measurements, relying upon training and separate ingredients list that
is tightly controlled. The key is to avoid making it so easy that someone just needs to
take one document to obtain critical intellectual property. The more records a person
has to search through and assemble, the greater his or her chances are of getting caught.
Biotechnology firms will want to be especially careful with trade secret processes. It is
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Third, trade secrecy’s limits may restrict its incentives to only some types
of innovation. Concerns about departing employees taking trade secrets may
disfavor broadly applicable innovations in favor of very product-specific innovations because fewer competitors could use the specific information and it would
be worth less to them. Furthermore, some innovations are inherently hard to reward through trade secrecy. For instance, because trade secrets are harder to license, a trade secret regime provides lower incentives for innovations that require widespread use by multiple actors (e.g., network effects) to create value for
the innovator. These types of broad innovations—like sampling techniques,
quality analysis, or process workflow—are key to large-scale improvements in
pharmaceutical manufacturing. Unfortunately, they also fit poorly with an intellectual property regime dominated by trade secrets.
Despite trade secrets’ limits, they are undoubtedly a key tool in protecting
pharmaceutical manufacturing techniques. They can completely bar a competitor
from the market or give a market participant a significant cost advantage. Trade
secrets, however, are difficult and uncertain to enforce and carry significant costs
for their possessor in terms of maintaining secrecy and preventing disclosure of
the secret. More significantly from a social perspective, trade secrecy prevents
the information flow essential for cumulative innovation and may function poorly for particular types of broad innovation.
Overall, trade secrecy has problems as a primary innovation incentive, and
patents and regulatory market protection are either ineffective or unavailable.
This absence of incentives means that companies regularly fail to surmount the
regulatory hurdles to innovation. The innovation deficiency of pharmaceutical
manufacturing, with its major attendant problems, is the unfortunate result. 331

absolutely essential to split such processes over multiple SOPs, leaving out critical parameters whenever possible, referring a reader to other, more tightly controlled documents.
Id.

331
Although this Article describes mostly brand-name drug companies, generic companies face
the same central problem of juxtaposed low intellectual property incentives and high regulatory barriers to change. Setting aside the 180-day period of exclusivity sometimes available for the first generic
to enter the market, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1 (1998), available at http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm079342.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/NWT2-5HD6, generics also face timing pressures when entering the market. Because the price and market share of an individual generic drops rapidly as more generics enter
the market, entering the market quickly is quite valuable. Thus, generics face similar incentives to
make ANDA approval as quick as possible. Other regulatory barriers, including procedural hurdles,
substantive lock-in, and de facto standards, all also apply to generics. And although the relatively low
margins of generic manufacturing may increase the relative salience of manufacturing cost-savings,
generics still face the absence of any supramarket incentives for innovation.
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III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MANUFACTURING INNOVATION POLICY
The lack of innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing is a complex and
multifaceted problem. Higher levels of innovation, both within individual firms
and across firms through the mechanism of cumulative innovation, would benefit the industry and the health care system as a whole. The drug industry innovates in drug discovery and development, but other industries innovate in manufacturing. These comparators suggest that drug manufacturing could be a successful target of innovation policy. 332
The complexity of the problem, arising from interacting intellectual property and regulatory structures, forestalls a single simple solution. The unique role
that regulatory oversight plays in creating hurdles to manufacturing innovation,
and the contrary role oversight plays in facilitating innovation in the context of
drug discovery and development, suggests that regulatory changes may provide
the best policy levers to improve a moribund manufacturing innovation policy.333
Some potential changes focus solely on regulatory hurdles. Others, however,
suggest ways that regulation could mediate and change innovation incentives.
Regulation could shape these incentives to drive manufacturing innovation more
effectively by encouraging firms to surmount what regulatory hurdles are necessary. 334 This type of cooperative approach works well in drug discovery and development and also offers possibilities for innovative manufacturing. One final
332
These proposed policy changes, although addressing only the domestic market, also have
international implications. Drug manufacturing takes place in a global marketplace, but an exhaustive
comparative account of global pharmaceutical manufacturing oversight is far beyond the scope of this
Article. North America, however, comprised 41.8% of the global pharmaceutical market in 2011.
EUROPEAN FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN FIGURES: KEY
DATA2012, at 4 (2012), available at http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Modules/Documents/efpia_
figures_2012_final-20120622-003-en-v1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D5T3-E2YX. And the FDA
regulates drug manufacturers in 190 countries producing drugs for the U.S. market. See FDA’s International Posts: Improving the Safety of Imported Food and Medical Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://test.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm185769.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/C8X6-6934 (last updated Mar. 31, 2010). Furthermore, other regulatory regimes are broadly
similar and similarly inhibit manufacturing innovation. Telephone Interview with Prabir Basu, President, Pharma Mfg. (May 6, 2013); Telephone Interview with Hedley Rees, Managing Consultant,
PharmaFlow, Ltd. (Mar. 8, 2013). Domestic solutions have the potential for international implications
if innovation is developed here and then spreads; that innovation can be regulatory (i.e., the new structures being proposed here), or manufacturing (i.e., the intended results of those new structures). This
is particularly true because many markets outside the EU and Japan accept approval of manufacturing
changes by the FDA without the need for independent review.
333
In addition, regulatory changes provide better opportunities for carefully targeting innovation
policy, rather than broad shifts in intellectual property, which are likely to have cross-industry implications.
334
The distinction between these types of changes is not perfectly clear-cut. For instance, proposals to shift procedural hurdles earlier to force earlier manufacturing understanding may push the
development of patentable ideas earlier as well. This shift would help fix the timing mismatch between drug substance patents and related manufacturing patents, where the latter may be developed
too late to capture their full value.
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possibility considers using market quality signals to create incentives for firms.
This Article does not evaluate other monetary innovation incentives, such as taxes, prizes, and grants. 335
Section A of this Part addresses possible changes to the regulatory structure
to encourage innovation. 336 Section B of this Part then discusses how regulations
themselves may be used to incentivize manufacturing innovation. 337 Finally,
Section C discusses the market’s lack of quality indicators and quality competition and suggests methods for coping with these market shortcomings. 338
A. Changes to Regulatory Structures
Reforming the oversight structure is one mechanism for improving innovation because regulatory oversight imposes both procedural and substantive hurdles to manufacturing innovation. Five different types of regulatory reform could
help. First, federal regulatory oversight could be removed entirely, letting states
or market and tort systems regulate pharmaceutical manufacturing. 339 Second,
the FDA could improve innovation by reducing its substantive barriers. 340 One
such effort that is slowly progressing is the FDA’s Quality by Design (“QbD”)
initiative. 341 Third, the FDA could provide increased regulatory flexibility, thus
loosening procedural barriers to innovative change. 342 Fourth, the FDA could
change industry development incentives by requiring deeper manufacturing understanding earlier in the development process. 343 Fifth and finally, the FDA
could provide an independent validation pathway for new technologies, separate
from the NDA process. 344
1. Removing or Privatizing Oversight
The most radical proposal for addressing regulatory limitations on innovation—but one always available in theory—is to remove regulation entirely. Pro335

A rich literature describes these other innovation incentives. For an excellent overview of the
literature and a taxonomy of innovation incentives, see generally Daniel Jacob Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013). Once the central problem of mismatched incentives and regulatory barriers is noted, the choice of solutions—and of particular forms of incentives—can be varied according to the desired effects. Some potential prize solutions might involve tailoring the reward to a fraction of industry-wide cost savings, which would encourage firms to share and teach their innovations; such a scheme would be administratively challenging to implement, however.
336
See infra notes 339–403 and accompanying text.
337
See infra notes 404–425 and accompanying text.
338
See infra notes 426–444 and accompanying text.
339
See infra notes 345–357 and accompanying text.
340
See infra notes 358–374 and accompanying text.
341
See infra notes 375–384 and accompanying text.
342
See infra notes 375–388 and accompanying text.
343
See infra notes 389–397 and accompanying text.
344
See infra notes 398–403 and accompanying text.
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ponents of this approach suggest that the FDA be removed from the role of regulating drug development, manufacturing, and marketing. 345 FDA removal could
result in the absence of any oversight at all. Before the FDA existed, however,
the industry suffered enormous quality problems, so a complete removal of all
regulation would be unlikely. 346 Instead, oversight would likely fall to the states
or to the market and tort systems. 347
Removing the FDA’s regulatory power and federal preemption of drug regulation would allow states to regulate drug manufacturing. 348 State oversight,
however, would likely face fierce opposition from drug manufacturers, who already must navigate the challenge of complying with different national drug
regulation regimes in multiple countries. 349 If state regulations were to replace
the FDA and federal oversight, then the problems of complying with dozens of
additional regulatory regimes would weigh heavily against any possible benefit
to innovation.
Alternately, regulation of manufacturing safety could be left to the market.
Private certification bodies, instead of the FDA, could certify that marketed
drugs are safe and effective, as is done today for certain consumer goods. 350
Compliance with private certification could either be left entirely to market
mechanisms to establish or could be federally mandated.351 Drug manufacturers
would submit to an inspection regime run by private certification bodies, which

345

See N.D. CAMPBELL, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS, MAKING DRUGS SAFE AND AVAILABLE WITHOUT THE FDA 1–5 (1997) (arguing for removing FDA oversight primarily to eliminate de-

lays in approving new drugs).
346
See Barbara K. Immel, A Brief History of the GMPs for Pharmaceuticals, 25 PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. 44, 44–46 (2001). At least part of the problem with relying solely on tort law to govern
pharmaceutical manufacturing arises from the difficulty of observing errors, connecting manufacturing errors to injury, and spotting defects that society may wish to prevent but which may not cause
cognizable injury—such as overly large fluctuations in the amount of active ingredients. See generally
infra notes 425–444 and accompanying text (discussing consumers’ difficulties of assessing drug
quality).
347
See CAMPBELL, supra note 345, at 9–16 (discussing the benefits of private third-party regulation).
348
Federal preemption of state drug laws (including tort liability) is a tangled field, with different
preemption standards for generics and reference products, drugs, and devices. In addition, different
preemption standards apply to enacted state regulation as opposed to requirements imposed by state
tort lawsuits. For a summary of this area, see generally Leonard A. Dwarica & Nicholas R. Herrel,
Federal Preemption of Drugs and Devices—Consequences for Injured Patients?, 25 HEALTH LAW. 4
(2012); Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the Potential
for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793 (2011).
349
Telephone Interview with Geoffrey Levitt, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
Pfizer (Dec. 20, 2012).
350
See CAMPBELL, supra note 345, at 1, 10.
351
See id. at 9–14 (discussing an example of successful private third-party drug regulation and
the possibilities of expanding this model).
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would accordingly certify that products were manufactured according to that
body’s standards. 352
Several concerns arise from such a market certification approach. First, the
protection of consumers from dangerous drugs might be considered too important to entrust to private enforcement. Second, the existence of multiple certification bodies could lead to consumer confusion and the potential for a race to
the bottom, where different bodies compete in the market to have essentially
laxer standards. Because indicators of drug quality are hard for consumers and
doctors to evaluate, 353 determining which certification body actually rigorously
enforced manufacturing standards and which provided only the patina of respectability might be particularly difficult. 354 In addition, certification bodies
themselves might steer clear of the market based on liability concerns. 355 Furthermore, manufacturing products for sale abroad could encounter major hurdles
if only private bodies certified manufacturers. 356
More fundamentally, shifting to private certification might not actually improve innovation in manufacturing very much. Key potential reasons for FDA
barriers to innovation would apply similarly to private certification bodies. Private certification bodies would likely have equal or less expertise than the FDA
and could easily be equally or more risk averse than the FDA. 357 In addition,

352

See id. This type of mixed private-public regime is employed in other healthcare spheres,
including in hospital certification and Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”). See Timothy Jost, Health
Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 9–11 (2004).
353
See infra notes 426–444 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of assessing drug
quality).
354
IRBs provide a useful comparison. These federally mandated ethics bodies preapprove research projects with the goal of protecting research subjects. Academic journal editors could potentially evaluate research on ethical compliance, measured by approval by a well-reputed IRB. This would
create incentives for strong IRBs. But IRB approval is instead treated as binary—IRB approved or
not—and consequently, IRBs have proliferated, with a resulting rise in for-profit IRBs, ethical problems, and concerns of IRB-shopping. A similar dynamic could easily arise for drug manufacturing
quality indicators. For one critique among many of IRBs in the drug research context, see Carl Elliott,
Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at A27.
355
See CAMPBELL, supra note 345, at 15–16.
356
The European Union, for instance, requires that manufacturing controls be certified by a government agency to meet EU standards for any imported medical products. See Directive 2011/62/EU,
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 Amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the
Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products For Human Use, as Regards the Prevention of the
Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 74, 78–79,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2011_62/dir_2011_62_en.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/5UH8-DDXS.
357
Risky actions by the FDA generate backlash, but front-line agents are relatively politically
insulated. With a private certification body, the firm and its agents could be subject to private tort
liability, leading to increased risk aversion. In contrast, the FDA and its agents are shielded from liability for discretionary decisions by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012). See generally Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion:
Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47
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private bodies are just as likely as the FDA to rely on drug characteristics established in clinical trials, as opposed to fundamental science-based specifications.
Private oversight, therefore, would likely suffer the same substantive barriers to
manufacturing innovation as the current system.
Practically speaking, removing the FDA’s regulatory authority to oversee
manufacturing is unlikely. From an industry point of view, any benefit to market
forces potentially promoting more efficient oversight might be outweighed by
the problem of competing state or private standards. Private bodies could easily
face similar incentives for excessive caution as the FDA. In addition, given diminished consumer perceptions of the pharmaceutical industry, both consumers
and the industry may prefer quality oversight by a relatively respected federal
government regulator than a private or local body.
2. Mandated Innovation
A second approach involves correcting substantive regulatory hurdles to innovation. The FDA has already taken steps toward this goal in its QbD initiative. 358 QbD is a combination of mandated innovation, via FDA requirements of
greater understanding and control, and a consequent reduction of substantive
barriers arising from the current lack of such understanding.
QbD springs from the concept that “quality cannot be tested into products;
it should be built-in or should be by design.” 359 More pragmatically, drugs are
typically manufactured according to a stable, monitored process designed to
keep parameters highly consistent over time; quality control happens through
end-stage testing to identify out-of-specification products. In QbD, production is
designed based on scientific understandings and drugs are made in a closely
monitored dynamic process, where each stage of the process can be adjusted
based on real-time measurements and analyses such that the end result already
has a predefined quality level. 360 The aim of QbD is that by the time the drugs
roll off the production lines, the manufacturer already knows the exact quality of
the final products. 361 End-stage testing is used only to verify quality, not to ensure that the products are high-quality in the first place. 362

ME. L. REV. 365 (1995) (discussing the FTCA and the many cases involving the discretionary function
exemption).
358
Anurag S. Rathore & Helen Winkle, Quality by Design for Biopharmaceuticals, 27 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 26, 27 (2009). Although QbD-like initiatives exist in other jurisdictions, this Subsection focuses on the regulations and guidance issued by the FDA and the domestic implementation
of QbD.
359
Id. at 27.
360
Yu, supra note 62, at 784.
361
Id.
362
Id.
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QbD helps ameliorate substantive obstacles to innovation. 363 If manufacturers have significant knowledge early in the development process—as QbD
effectively requires—those drug characteristics that do become regulatorily calcified have a much better chance of being already optimized for long-term manufacturing. More fundamentally, to the extent that deep knowledge of drug products is developed and shared with the FDA, substantive calcification may become less necessary. QbD itself is a significant source of manufacturing innovation because it has potential business benefits even without improvements in
regulatory oversight. 364
The industry is slowly adopting at least parts of QbD, though with major
variations across sectors. 365 Assessments of QbD adoption differ even within the
FDA. 366 The FDA has not promulgated regulations enforcing or requiring QbD,
but has stated informally that full QbD implementation is expected in the near
future. 367 After this informal statement, the fraction of ANDAs including multiple QbD elements increased from 24.6% in June 2012 to 82.9% in the first half

363
See generally supra notes 184–204 and accompanying text (discussing substantive FDA barriers to innovation, including regulatory lock-in—which results from manufacturers having to submit
their processes for FDA approval before they are able to develop the most efficient methods of production).
364
QbD can potentially increase time and efficiency. In one case study, time from dispensing
ingredients to market availability decreased from 12 to 4 days, and quality control time was reduced
from 8 days to 8 hours, leading to “a major cost-saving” and “additional assurance that [a] product
will pass specification, giving a more predictable supply chain.” Chris Potter, PQLI Application of
Science- and Risk-based Approaches (ICH Q8, Q9, and Q10) to Existing Products, 4 J. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 4, 21 (2009). Potential cost savings between $20 and $30 billion have been estimated. See Cox, supra note 78. Roger Nosal at Pfizer has estimated that QbD saved Pfizer in excess
of $800 million over six or seven years and suggested that similar amounts could apply to other similar companies. Cox, supra note 122; see Cox, supra note 78.
365
See Joanne Eglovitch, Generic Industry Has Made Progress Implementing QbD, GOLD SHEET
(Feb. 28, 2013, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-gold-sheet/47/2/
generic-industry-has-made-progress-implementing-qbd.
366
For example, on December 4, 2012, Janet Woodcock, Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”)—a division of the FDA—stated, “I don’t know how widely QbD will be
adopted, because there is a significant upfront investment,” and that “I think it’s fair to say, we’re not
there yet.” Cox, supra note 122. Just three weeks before, Christine Moore, Acting Director of the
Office of New Drug Quality Assessment in CDER’s Office of Pharmaceutical Science, stated that
“quality by design has really caught on in industry,” that “the science and risk-based approaches in
QbD [are] being embraced by pretty much all of the innovator pharmaceutical companies,” and finally
that “we’re likely past the tipping point in QbD.” Id.
367
Nick Taylor, FDA Developing QbD Examples to Ready Generic Industry for 2013 Deadline,
IN-PHARMATECHNOLOGIST.COM (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/Processing/
FDA-developing-QbD-examples-to-ready-generic-industry-for-2013-deadline, archived at http://
perma.cc/QK4X-Q9X9 (quoting Lawrence Yu, Deputy Director for Science and Chemistry in the
Office of Generic Drugs, as stating that the Office “expects . . . full implementation of QbD in January
2013”).
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of January 2013. 368 These ANDA submissions, however, appear to prioritize
QbD form over substance: 369 submissions commonly included a massive amount
of information without justification or conclusions, used QbD terminology improperly, or presented prior knowledge without necessary context or justification. 370 Thus, the industry still has far to go in actually incorporating QbD methodologies to increase manufacturing efficiency and regulatory efficacy. 371
QbD techniques are subject to the same forms of market protection as other
manufacturing techniques. Firms have shown interest in patenting QbD techniques, though the safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) raises enforceability
questions for those patents. 372 Like other manufacturing techniques, though,
QbD techniques are largely protected as trade secrets rather than being patented
and thereby publicized. 373
In sum, although QbD involves a regulatory mandate to address at least
some of the innovation concerns raised above, it is far from a complete solution.
Industry adoption of QbD has been slow and highly heterogeneous, and there is
evidence that many companies are adopting QbD in name far more than in practice. To the extent that QbD relies on regulatory compliance rather than innovation incentives, innovation will likely be limited to that specifically demanded by
the FDA. The one incentive associated with QbD, and that most relevant to the
procedural innovation barriers described above, is the possibility of regulatory
flexibility. Unfortunately, that promise has so far proven illusory. 374

368
James, Davidson FDA Study on the Status of QbD Implementation in the Generic Industry,
LACHMAN CONSULTANTS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.lachmanconsultants.com/fda-study-on-thestatus-of-qbd-implementation-in-the-generic-industry.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/825R-DE3P.
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Cox, supra note 122; Ted Fuhr & Katy George, Moving Beyond the Business Case for QbD,
PHARMA QBD (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.pharmaqbd.com/mckinsey_beyond_business_case_qbd/,
archived at http://perma.cc/P9Z5-7B6F. See generally Beth H. Junker, Building a Business Case for
Biopharmaceutical QbD Implementation, 25 BIOPHARM INT’L 40 (2012) (proposing a model for applying QbD to biopharmaceutical products).
372
See supra notes 248–269 and accompanying text (discussing the safe harbor provision of the
Hatch-Waxman Act). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (providing that there is no patent
infringement if the patented process or technology is only used to prepare submissions to the FDA so
that generics may be released as soon as the patent expires).
373
See Cox, supra note 122. Roger Nosal of Pfizer stated, “One of the things that quality by design has not yielded for most of us is quantifiable value that companies have been willing to share,
although we’ve seen bits and pieces from time to time.” Id. He went on to remark that “people are a
little reluctant to say how much they’re saving by doing a quality-by-design approach.” Id. Similarly,
Emil Ciurczak, the President of Doramaxx Consulting, writes, “The reason you don’t hear many hardcore examples is that many companies consider QbD a competitive edge, so [they] don’t want to
share—especially with generics.” Id. He further notes, “Thus, actual QbD successes are kept under
better security than the recipe for Coca-Cola.” Id.
374
See infra notes 375–388 and accompanying text (explaining that QbD has failed to create
regulatory flexibility to spur procedural innovation).
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3. Regulatory Flexibility
Allowing greater regulatory flexibility to reduce procedural barriers is a
major possibility for improving innovation. This approach has been linked to
QbD, but with little effect to date, as discussed below in Subsection 3.a.375 Regulatory flexibility, however, is an important potential solution on its own merits,
as discussed below in Subsection 3.b. 376
a. Flexibility and QbD
The FDA touted greater flexibility within predefined and well-characterized
limits as an advantage of QbD. Rather than a process being defined as a set of
rigid steps and measurements with minimum allowable deviation, QbD establishes a process “design space” —a set of parameters within which the firm
knows the product being produced is high quality. 377 Process changes within an
FDA-approved design space should not require regulatory approval. 378 This
would allow innovation within a defined set of parameters without regulatory
hurdles and would consequently enable more incremental innovation.
Despite at least moderate progress adopting QbD, however, regulatory flexibility has failed to materialize. Instead, FDA reviewers have challenged the type
of risk-based regulatory filings expected by QbD—which emphasize tighter controls on risk-linked processes but deemphasize non-risky processes—as insufficiently detailed. 379 Even though top-level FDA policy may include regulatory
flexibility in response to greater knowledge-based QbD filings, it appears that
FDA actors on the ground—both approving filings and inspecting plants—have
tended to follow the traditional patterns of review rather than adopt the intended
additional flexibility. 380 Given the significant discretion accorded to such frontline regulators and industry reluctance to challenge exercises of that discretion, 381 implementing flexibility at the ground level may be particularly challenging.
Policymakers themselves have recognized this failure to achieve regulatory
flexibility. Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and
375

See infra notes 377–383 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 384–388 and accompanying text.
377
Yu, supra note 62, at 788–89. The design space is the multidimensional space which includes
all combinations of parameters resulting in the desired final product. See id. The acceptable range of
parameters varies based on the sensitivity of the process outcome to variation in that parameter. See id.
Design space is more complex than a set of parameter ranges because different parameters can interact; for instance, a process could be very sensitive to temperature in acidic environments but not in
non-acidic ones. See id.
378
Id. at 789.
379
Eglovitch, supra note 40.
380
Telephone Interview with Hedley Rees, supra note 332.
381
See generally CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 635–62 (providing a detailed description of the
dynamics between drug manufacturers and the FDA).
376
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Research (“CDER”) at the FDA, recently remarked, “A quid pro quo people said
would really sweeten the deal [was that] if in fact you did QbD, made that investment, then you would have a lot of freedom to operate afterward. I don’t
think we have robustly achieved that goal . . . . [O]ver the past decade, the regulations and the regulators have not really adapted that much.” 382 FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg reiterated this view in February 2013, stating, “[I]n a
world where quality risk management is fully embraced, we could foresee a time
when enhanced regulatory flexibility might be possible.” 383 Thus, meaningfully
implementing the regulatory flexibility associated with QbD would likely require greater adoption of QbD flexibility principles on the front line and renewed
support for that flexibility from FDA policymakers, who now seem to describe it
as a foregone possibility.
b. Flexibility by Voluntary FDA Certification
As an alternative to QbD, regulatory flexibility could come from a new
program of voluntary FDA certification of certain manufacturing sites. For sites
that consistently demonstrate quality performance above that required by regulation, the FDA could approve increased regulatory flexibility. For example, major
changes could be implemented with only notice, rather than preapproval.384 Such
a program would allow manufacturers with a record of excellence and high quality production the regulatory flexibility to innovate and continuously improve; it
would also provide an incentive to other manufacturers to innovate to achieve
that level of excellence and receive the reward of flexibility.
A system of certified regulatory flexibility would not be entirely novel, but
would be new to drug manufacturing. The Occupational Safety and Health
Agency (“OSHA”) runs a similar program, wherein worksites that demonstrate
safety excellence may seek certification in the Voluntary Protection Programs,
subject to renewal every three to five years. 385 Although part of the program, the
sites are exempt from programmed agency inspection and OSHA does not issue
citations for promptly corrected violations observed during scheduled evaluations. 386 The agency, however, still investigates complaints and other significant
events. 387 Workplaces that participate in OSHA’s program have shown signifi382
Cox, supra note 122 (citing Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Keynote Address at the 2012 IQ Symposium (Dec. 5, 2012)).
383
Hamburg, supra note 112 (emphasis added).
384
See generally supra notes 171–183 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for
postapproval filing with the FDA for major, moderate, and minor process changes).
385
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DIRECTIVE NO. CSP03-01-003, OSHA INSTRUCTION 8 (2008), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/
CSP_03-01-003.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q28Y-8KRP.
386
Id. at 8–10.
387
Id.
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cant improvements in worker safety, product quality, and profits. 388 A similar
program in pharmaceutical manufacturing could offer potentially major benefits
without significant regulatory burdens.
4. Altered Regulatory Timelines
Rather than relying solely on procedural or substantive reforms, the FDA
could blend the two to change firms’ internal development incentives by requiring significantly greater understanding of drug manufacturing parameters earlier
in the development process. Currently, INDs in Phase I clinical trials can begin
human testing with significantly less stringent requirements for cGMP and
Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls (“CMCs”) than those required for Phase
II or III trials or commercial sale. 389 This allows firms to put off developing sophisticated knowledge of a drug’s manufacturing characteristics—such as how
the drug can best be formulated, what inactive ingredients are most appropriate
for final dosage forms, and how fast the drugs should dissolve—until clinical
trials have already begun. The actual requirements for CMC and cGMP information when beginning Phase I trials are quite low because the FDA is focused
on guaranteeing safety, but not on other aspects of the drug’s eventual development process, like the potential for high-quality manufacturing on a commercial
scale. 390
If the FDA instead required that companies submit significant CMC and
cGMP information with an IND, rather than just evidence of safety and some
basic manufacturing controls, then firms would be forced to generate that additional information before beginning human trials. This would help avoid the current process of locking-in inefficient manufacturing processes and supply chain
dynamics. 391
One downside to this approach is the wasted time and money spent developing information about manufacturability for the vast majority of drugs that
will never make it to market. There are two responses that lessen this concern.
388
Brian Bennett & Norman Deitch, OSHA’s VPP: The Value of Participating, 52 PROF. SAFETY
24, 27, 29 (2007).
389
INDs are still required to comply with § 501(a)(2)(B) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
which mandates the use of current good manufacturing practices. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)
(2012). Under 21 C.F.R. § 210.2(c) (2013), however, drugs used in Phase I clinical trials need not
conform to 21 C.F.R. § 211 (governing GMPs), unless the drug is also being used in Phase II or Phase
III trials or has been marketed. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CGMP FOR PHASE 1 INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS 1 (2008), available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm070273.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F377-F23K.
390
Telephone Interview with Hedley Rees, supra note 332; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 389, at 12 (“For some materials, all relevant attributes or acceptance criteria may not be known at the phase 1 stage of product development.”).
391
REES, supra note 158, at 405–07.
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First, although the total development attrition rate is very high, the relevant attrition rate for this regulatory shift is from entry into Phase I trials—for which an
IND is required but relatively little manufacturing understanding is required—to
drugs entering Phase II trials—during which manufacturing information is fully
developed and where cGMP regulations come into force. Thus, assuming that
the information needs to be generated for drugs in Phase II, and considering that
approximately 60% of drugs that enter Phase I trials make it to Phase II trials, 392
only 40% of information development costs will be for drugs which ultimately
fail—a high fraction, but less than half. 393
Second, and mediating the first response, at least some attrition in the drug
pipeline occurs for concerns related to manufacturing. In 2000, roughly 5% of
drugs failed to proceed because they were too difficult to formulate and roughly
10% failed because they were too expensive to manufacture. 394 Because later
phases of clinical development are significantly more expensive, 395 determining
earlier that a drug will be too costly to manufacture or too difficult to formulate
can reduce costs later in the pipeline. Catching this problem earlier will partially
offset the costs of generating unnecessary information for eventually unsuitable
candidates. 396
This regulatory shift would mean that more manufacturing processes would
be established on the basis of better information earlier in the drug development
pipeline. Procedural requirements could thus overcome the current financial incentives to push off manufacturing development until absolutely necessary, lessening the substantive barriers of empiricism-based consistency requirements. 397

392

Kola & Landis, supra note 200, at 713 fig.1(b).
Approximately 20% of drugs make it from Phase I to Phase III. Id.
394
Id. at 714 fig.3.
395
See id. at 712.
396
The obvious question arises: If this approach would already save costs, why aren’t companies
adopting it? One possibility is that the offset is only partial, in which case otherwise externalized social benefits of higher-quality manufacturing would need to be weighed against increased industry
costs. Another factor is that firms face strong time pressures to commercialize a drug rapidly to maximize the period of patent-protected market exclusivity. Because the patent clock starts running early
in development, firms may avoid generating additional manufacturing-related information before
beginning human trials. The competitive features of this problem would be avoided if applied equally
to all firms. If, on the other hand, requiring such a delay makes commercialization impracticable (by,
for instance, unacceptably shortening the usable patent term), a patent-term extension could counterbalance the regulation-based delay.
397
See generally supra notes 184–204 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive barriers
to innovation posed by the FDA’s regulations). This approach could also help lessen the problem of
mismatches in patent timing described earlier, see supra note 247; if understanding and innovation
shift earlier in the drug development process, more of the lifetime of any resultant patents would occur
during the patent-protected period when the innovative manufacturer controls the entire market.
393

2014]

Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing

551

5. A Separate Validation Pathway
One final regulatory possibility could address the challenge of FDA reluctance to adopt new technologies by creating a mechanism to validate new technologies detached from the drug approval process. As discussed above, the FDA
has historically been reluctant to accept novel technologies, especially in the
context of an NDA. 398 As a result, because preapproval delay is extremely costly,
firms avoid seeking approval in NDAs for novel manufacturing methods.399 This
disincentive for manufacturing innovation can be reduced by allowing firms to
introduce and validate novel techniques for the FDA separate from any particular
NDA. 400
If firms can demonstrate to the FDA that novel manufacturing techniques
function reproducibly and can be validated, then that demonstration could be
relied upon by the FDA in any NDA or sNDA seeking to use the new technique.
This would be particularly useful for broadly applicable techniques, like
HPLC 401 or, more currently, continuous manufacturing dynamically modulated
by in-line measurements. 402 Regulatory approval of a new technique could allay
worries about including that technique in an NDA. Today, HPLC is used in essentially all NDAs, but it took a long time and unusually persistent sponsors to
achieve that result. An independent process for new technologies could speed
and regularize that process. It could also shield FDA reviewers from risk-averse
pressures to avoid novel techniques by decoupling them from the risks of new
drugs. 403
A standalone validation process would also ideally be open to firms other
than drug sponsors, such as contract manufacturing organizations (“CMOs”),
equipment vendors, and manufacturers from other industries. The incentive for
this regulatory effort would vary by sponsor: efficiency and quality gains from
the new technology for a drug sponsor, potential equipment sales for a vendor,
398

See supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text (analyzing the FDA’s preapproval barriers to
innovation).
399
See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 67–68. This problem exists principally for preapproval
innovation, which would be incorporated into an NDA, because preapproval delay cuts into patentprotected market exclusivity, whereas postapproval delays in implementing manufacturing innovations do not. Restrictions on innovation preapproval, however, also limit the available possibilities for
innovation postapproval through the procedural and substantive hurdles previously discussed. See
generally supra notes 168–204 and accompanying text.
400
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 151, at 147–48 (discussing making
“dummy” submissions of new technologies to the FDA—including standard operating procedures—
unlinked to any particular NDA to avoid risk of regulatory delay).
401
See generally supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text (discussing the industry’s struggle
to obtain FDA approval of HPLC).
402
See generally Jennifer Markarian, Process Analytical Technology and Process Control in Solid-Dosage Manufacturing, 37 PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. 56 (2013) (noting that the industry is moving
toward closed-loop control of continuous processing).
403
See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 67–68.
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potential clients for a CMO, or patent royalties for any of the above, but especially for manufacturers from other industries. Patent royalties or other manufacturing exclusivity incentives would provide even better incentives if the intellectual property regime for manufacturing could be improved.
B. Using Regulation to Change Innovation Incentives
Although lowering regulatory barriers could make it easier to innovate, incentives are likely needed to drive optimal innovation past remaining barriers
not present in other industries’ manufacturing sectors. 404 Wide-reaching changes
to the intellectual property system as a whole are both beyond the scope of this
piece and unnecessary to address the industry-constrained problem of pharmaceutical manufacturing. The pervasive regulatory oversight in the pharmaceutical industry, and the successful integration of regulation with patent incentives in
drug discovery, however, suggest that regulatory structures could help improve
intellectual property incentives for innovation.
The drug industry is virtually unique in the close supervision of whether
and how a product can be introduced. The costs of this supervision are large but
accepted. Treating this industry oversight as a given, structural changes with potentially tremendous benefits for innovation could be implemented with relatively small changes and additional costs. Structural improvements could come in
two major forms. First, as discussed in Subsection 1 of this Section, regulatory
action could augment and change the functioning of the intellectual property
system, using disclosure requirements to drive the industry from an opaque,
trade secrecy-based system to a more transparent, patent-based system. 405 Second, as analyzed in Subsection 2 of this Section, an expansion of regulatory
market exclusivity incentives for manufacturing innovation could parallel the

404

It is also possible that regulatory reform alone might be sufficient. Market forces and industry
dynamics will drive some innovative shifts; some studies have suggested that QbD adoption has been
partially driven by business factors. See generally Fuhr & George, supra note 371; Junker, supra note
371. Innovation theory, however, suggests that well-functioning innovation incentives are still necessary, because firms’ inability to capture large portions of total innovation value results in underinvestment in innovation from a social perspective. See K.J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619, 623 (R.R.
Nelson ed., 1962); Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.
J. ECON. 1119, 1134 (1998). This is likely particularly true for manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry because consumers are relatively cost-insensitive and thus manufacturing costs
can be passed on. Quality-increasing innovation may be extremely valuable socially but of relatively
low value to manufacturers beyond the quality needed for regulatory approval of market entry because
that additional quality, like manufacturing costs, is typically opaque to consumers. See infra notes
426–444 and accompanying text (discussing consumers’ inability to detect drug quality). Incentives
are therefore likely a necessary addition to regulatory improvements to drive socially preferable levels
of manufacturing innovation.
405
See infra notes 407–418 and accompanying text.
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existing intellectual property systems, much as regulatory exclusivity for drugs
already parallels the patent system. 406
1. Mandatory Disclosure to Reshape Intellectual Property Incentives
The major misalignment of intellectual property protection for pharmaceutical manufacturing is the dominance of trade secrets over patents, which is driven by the widespread and accurate perception that manufacturing patents are
very difficult to enforce successfully. 407 Trade secrets and patents on manufacturing methods are both difficult to enforce once the competitor is using the protected process, but trade secrets can keep competitors from getting the information in the first place. If manufacturing patents were easier to observe and
enforce, then firms could more easily rely on them to protect their innovation
investments. This swap would trade a typically shorter monopoly period (because trade secrets can exist indefinitely) for easier enforcement upon observation of infringement, 408 the possibility of greater damages on a finding of willful
infringement, 409 and an environment of easier cumulative innovation, both infirm and cross-firm. 410 Increasing these incentives and allowing easier cumulative innovation could help increase the efficiency and quality of pharmaceutical
manufacturing. In addition, further industry benefits might arise from greater
potential mobility of employees unburdened by nondisclosure agreements and
consequent knowledge spillovers. 411 Benefits to those outside the industry would
include increased disclosure of whatever manufacturing innovations are generat-

406

See infra notes 419–425 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing patents in the pharmaceutical
industry).
408
Proving misappropriation of trade secrets in court is very challenging, including proving that
secrets were adequately protected and that misappropriation occurred instead of independent invention. See Gene Rzucidlo & Stefan Miller, Aggressive Intellectual Property Strategies, in BEST PRACTICES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT: VALUATION, LICENSING, CASH FLOW, PHARMACOECONOMICS, MARKET SELECTION, COMMUNICATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 286, at 61, 65.
409
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing that the court may award damages
“adequate to compensate for the infringement”).
410
See generally Erkal, supra note 327 (examining the best trade secret policies for encouraging
cumulative innovation); Scotchmer, supra note 31 (discussing the importance of continual improvements on initial innovations); supra notes 326–331 and accompanying text (discussing structural disadvantages of a trade secret regime).
411
See generally Matt Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage? Non-Compete Agreements and Brain
Drain (Nat’l Sci. Found., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=
1654719, archived at http://perma.cc/WFZ2-GDRU (arguing that noncompete agreements for employees prevent inventor mobility and cause good inventors to leave states that do enforce these
agreements for states that do not).
407
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ed, the possibility of greater manufacturing transparency, and the societal benefits of increased cumulative innovation. 412
Fully addressing the mechanics of this larger cultural and intellectual property regime shift is beyond the scope of this work. In brief, however, manufacturing practices would have to be significantly more transparent so that patent
infringement could be detected and the patent subsequently enforced. 413 Such
transparency would demand a significant cultural shift in an industry currently
dominated by secrecy, but could be significantly facilitated by the industry’s
heavily regulated nature. Manufacturers must already notify the FDA of the details of their manufacturing procedures and are subject to FDA inspections. Although actually enforcing manufacturing patents is well outside the scope of the
FDA’s authority, making publically available the registered manufacturing techniques and other manufacturing information currently maintained confidentially
by the FDA would allow firms to police their patented techniques themselves.
Such an approach would not be easy. In particular, there are significant statutory
and potential constitutional problems with revealing information previously disclosed to the FDA confidentially. 414 As a prospective solution for NDAs, ANDAs, and other manufacturing changes going forward, however, this idea faces
fewer challenges.
412
On the flip side, an increase in patenting could potentially stifle some other forms of innovation which are currently developed in parallel, but are not blocked by patent concerns, because independent invention is a defense against trade secret misappropriation actions but not patent infringement actions. DEAN RUSSELL ET AL., CHOOSING BETWEEN TRADE SECRET AND PATENT PROTECTION
18, available at https://clients.kilpatricktownsend.com/IPDeskReference/Documents/Trade%20Secret
%20or%20Patent%20Protection.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VE3N-XAZC.
413
If injunctive enforcement blocking cumulative innovation were a major worry, a mandatorylicensing regime could be contemplated instead. Cf. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94
(2006) (holding that permanent injunctive relief should issue in patent infringement cases only after a
showing of the four traditional equitable factors and reversing the Federal Circuit’s general rule favoring permanent injunctions).
414
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 291–99 (2011).
On the other hand, in 1974, in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that state
trade secrecy regimes were not preempted by the federal patent system, but also noted:

If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of
patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to exist. In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence from patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents exists. Trade
secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.
416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974). A colorable argument could be made, though it is outside the scope of
this Article, that drug manufacturing processes—or even manufacturing processes in general—face
weak enough protection under patent law that the availability of state trade secret protection actually
deters innovators from seeking patent protection. If that were indeed the case, trade secret protection
for those innovations might be constitutionally suspect, and mandatory disclosure of those innovations
might not be a taking requiring compensation. Cf. id.
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In fact, Congress has already mandated a limited version of this approach in
the approval process for biosimilars as authorized by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”).415 The BPCIA created an abbreviated approval pathway for biosimilars, but within twenty days of the FDA’s acceptance of an application for a biosimilar, the applicant must provide a copy of
the application to the reference product sponsor, including the method by which
the biosimilar is manufactured. 416 This information may only be viewed by the
reference product sponsor’s counsel, may not be disclosed to other employees,
and can be used only to determine potential patent infringement.417 This method
of enforcing manufacturing patents is unlinked to the FDA’s safety and efficacy
mandate. Instead, the FDA approval process facilitates enforcement of manufacturing patents by requiring disclosure to the most relevant patent-holder. 418 In at
least this context, transparency is already required to facilitate patent protection
and enforcement.
Changing from opacity to transparency would be a major shift for the industry. Nevertheless, manufacturers require more complex new technologies to
manage and evaluate production, especially for biologics. Thus, broad and cumulative innovation could well be worth the costs of mandated transparency.
2. A Parallel Regulatory Exclusivity Regime for Manufacturing Innovation
Rather than trying to shift the industry from a trade secrecy regime to a patent-based regime for manufacturing innovation, the FDA could administer a
parallel set of market protection incentives that could be more carefully tailored
to industry dynamics than patent or trade secrecy regimes. Currently, FDA market protection is statutorily available only for innovations in drug discovery or
development. The market protection regime could be congressionally expanded
to include innovation in manufacturing. This parallel system could grant market
protection, in the form of statutory market exclusivity, either to the innovative
manufacturing process or to a related or unrelated drug.
To address the less intuitive but more familiar solution first, the FDA could
reward manufacturing innovations by granting an additional period of market
exclusivity to a drug. The most straightforward form of this exclusivity would be
415

2013)).
416

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (West 2011 & Supp.

42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A).
Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)–(D). Unlike small-molecule drugs, for which patents are centrally registered
in the Orange Book, patents on biologics are not registered. Dougherty, supra note 242, at 234. The
BPCIA thus sets up a complex scheme in which the pioneer and follow-on manufacturers exchange
information on relevant patents. Id.; see § 262(l).
418
This process creates an advantage for the reference product sponsor as against any other holder of potentially relevant manufacturing process patents, which still face the standard difficulties enforcing their patents.
417
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granting market exclusivity to the drug product for which the manufacturing innovation was designed. If, for instance, Pfizer discovered an innovative new way
to manufacture higher-quality Lipitor, the FDA could extend Pfizer’s regulatory
exclusivity on Lipitor by keeping generic Lipitor off the market for an additional
period of time. This is the approach taken with pediatric clinical trials: a firm
completing pediatric trials receives an additional six months of market exclusivity. 419 Such a linked approach would be harder to apply to manufacturing innovations that are not linked to a specific drug, like an improved technique for ensuring tablet uniformity. That problem could be avoided by granting so-called
“wild-card” extensions, which would allow the firm to apply regulatory exclusivity to any drug in its portfolio. 420 Such wild-card extensions have been previously suggested as regulatory prizes for different types of pharmaceutical innovation. 421
There are significant concerns with product-based regulatory exclusivity,
centered on appropriately valuing the innovation. For example, the FDA might
have difficulty determining whether a manufacturing innovation is significant
enough to merit the bonus of regulatory exclusivity. In addition, the FDA would
need some mechanism of screening out useful innovations from marginal or inefficient innovations to avoid a situation where small manufacturing changes
continually extend drug exclusivity. The appropriate length for such an extension
would also be difficult to determine, though, for most drugs, even a very short
extension might be enough to overcome the hurdles currently hindering innovation. Furthermore, the value of the incentive may differ significantly by company because the value of a fixed period of time depends on the market value of
the drug; firms with higher-selling drugs would receive more value from the
same period of exclusivity. 422 These difficulties make product-based regulatory
exclusivity a problematic form of innovation incentive.
Alternately, regulatory exclusivity could be granted to the manufacturing
innovation itself by preventing other firms from using the innovation for some
period of time. Major manufacturing changes already require FDA approval before implementation. Thus, if a company demonstrated an innovative and useful
major change in manufacturing, and the FDA approved it for that company, then
the FDA could register the change and explicitly refuse to approve other compa-

419

See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2012); supra note 274 and accompanying text.
See Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
264, 265–66 (2009).
421
See id.
422
Getting value from regulatory exclusivity also requires having drugs where regulatory exclusivity would keep competitors off the market; firms whose drugs have strong and ongoing patent protection that would overlap with the period of regulatory exclusivity would receive less benefit from
the exclusivity than firms without patent protection.
420
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nies’ implementations of that change for a period of time.423 Once the exclusivity
period expired, all pending manufacturing change applications to use the innovative process could be automatically approved.
Applying regulatory exclusivity to efficiency-based innovations seems relatively unproblematic, though those innovations are most likely to be pursued as
worthwhile even without outside incentives. Creating exclusivity for qualityimproving manufacturing innovation is initially harder to square with the FDA’s
mission of ensuring high drug quality. If a manufacturing process increases the
quality of a final drug product, it seems highly counterintuitive for the FDA to
then prevent other manufacturers from using the same procedure. In other contexts, however, the FDA similarly prioritizes innovation incentives. For instance,
pediatric studies are rewarded with exclusivity for the entire drug line, for all
uses, not just pediatric uses. 424 This drug-line exclusivity sacrifices access to a
drug for the sake of more information for pediatric users. 425 In the long run, innovation is judged to be worth the short-term sacrifice.
Regulatory exclusivity for manufacturing innovation would avoid one of
the key problems of manufacturing process patents: the difficulty of enforcement. Because the FDA oversees pharmaceutical manufacturing, requires registration of manufacturing techniques, and preapproves major changes in manufacturing, the agency could readily prevent a firm from using a technique for
which regulatory exclusivity had been granted.
Regulatory exclusivity would not, however, avoid another major reason
that actual patents—as opposed to regulatory “pseudo-patents”—fail to create
adequate incentives for manufacturing innovation: the problem of public disclosure to competitors. If manufacturing innovations require public disclosure to
receive FDA regulatory exclusivity, then firms might avoid seeking that exclusivity to avoid that disclosure. Avoiding disclosure is a key reason why patents
are already ineffective. But, if FDA exclusivity occurs without public disclosure,
then the social and industrial benefits of such disclosure are lost.
Institutional competence is a much larger challenge. Applying regulatory
exclusivity to manufacturing innovation would substantially extend the “pseudopatent” regime beyond the very discrete world of drug products and yes-or-no
activities like the completion of pediatric trials or the approval of a new indica423
It is an arguable question, although outside the scope of this Article, whether the FDA could
implement such a significant policy absent statutory authorization. At least in theory, the approval of
manufacturing changes is left to the discretion of the agency, and encouraging manufacturing innovation is at least a plausible justification for delaying major manufacturing changes. On the other hand,
such a justification is certainly a major step away from the traditional safety-based justifications for
regulatory approval of manufacturing changes, and market protection for drugs has relied on congressional action.
424
See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b); Nat’l Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37, 38–41 (D.D.C.
1999).
425
See Henney, 47 F. Supp. at 38–41.
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tion. It would demand that the agency make hard judgments about which innovation is enough to justify exclusivity, what the boundaries of an innovation are,
what happens when two companies both seem to develop an innovation simultaneously, and what do to if one innovation incorporates another. These issues are
all familiar ones, but are familiar in the context of patent law, where firms can
rely on the expertise of the PTO and a large body of law developed by the federal courts. The FDA currently lacks the institutional competence—and the mandate—to develop a truly parallel pseudo-patent system alongside the actual patent regime.
Overall, although market exclusivity is the traditional form of incentive for
innovation, using either form of government-based exclusivity—patent or regulatory—is challenging for manufacturing innovations. Shifting from a secrecybased system of manufacturing innovation to a patent-based system is an intriguing and promising possibility, but demands systematic changes in transparency throughout the industry. Regulatory exclusivity seems a more straightforward
fix, and it has been previously applied when incentives were needed for pharmaceutical companies. But applying such innovations to manufacturing innovation
raises particularly challenging questions of valuation and institutional competence.
C. Quality Indicators and Market Pressure
Firm behavior is typically driven by market demand. Nevertheless, because
the drug market is effectively unable to recognize or reward manufacturing quality, the market does not demand a particular quality of product. 426 Janet Woodcock recently noted this in the context of drug shortages, specifically shortages
of generic sterile injectables. 427 A key reason for those shortages is that
healthcare consumers (whether doctors, hospitals, or the group purchasing organizations that act as middlemen in many drug markets) are unable to discern
differences in quality between the products of different manufacturers. 428 Because all generic versions of a drug are required to have “the same efficacy and
side effect profiles,” buyers consider the drugs to be perfect substitutes and assume that “the products are of sufficient quality if they are on the market.”429
426

Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 72, at 171–72.
Id. at 171.
428
Id.
429
Id. In addition, in the specific markets analyzed, quality may be especially difficult to measure
after the fact. In many markets, even if there is no ex ante way for consumers to differentiate products
based on quality, products can be differentiated ex post based on product performance and the rate of
product failure. Sterile injectable and infusible drugs, however, are usually administered to patients
who have compromised immune systems and lack the ability to effectively fight infections. Id. at 172.
Accordingly, drug contamination events are difficult to differentiate from infections that might otherwise occur in the treated population. Id. Most healthcare providers do not look to manufacturing products when they observe infections in, for instance, the cancer patients treated with a chemotherapy
427
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Accordingly, manufacturers compete only on price, not on quality, resulting in
nonrobust manufacturing procedures prone to breakdowns and causing shortages. 430
This lack of quality competition is hard for consumers, insurers, and the
FDA itself to detect. Microbial contamination, in particular, can be episodic and
non-uniform; 431 a poorly maintained or designed production line may only intermittently introduce contamination, which may itself be relatively benign or
very harmful. 432 Thus, traditional after-the-fact sampling protocols performed by
the manufacturer and reviewed by the FDA may miss sources of contamination. 433 Contributing to the lack of regulatory incentives for maintaining the
highest quality standards, the FDA’s response to contamination events is frequently tempered by its desire to avoid drug shortages. 434 Thus, manufacturers
face both a market that is approximately indifferent to quality—because quality
is hard to observe—and one that has a regulatory structure that can only occasionally detect quality problems and that imposes a restrained response. 435
As a result of this market and regulatory insensitivity to quality, “shortsighted firms [have] an incentive to manufacture under a minimum level of control.” 436 Many manufacturers therefore “minimize quality system investments.” 437
To cope with the lack of quality awareness, particularly in the market, Dr.
Woodcock suggests that “[the] FDA could support buyers and payers in their
purchase and reimbursement decisions by providing them with meaningful manufacturing quality metrics.” 438 Such metrics would be analogous to the use of

regime of (assumed-to-be) sterile injectable drugs, assuming—correctly—that such manufacturing
defects are relatively rare and that infections from other sources are relatively common. Id. As a result,
few providers will make the causal link and report that an adverse event is based on manufacturing
problems. Id.
430
Id.
431
Id.
432
Id. Other forms of contamination beside the microbial may also occur only in some instances,
such as the presence of glass or metal shards in product vials. Id. at 171.
433
Id. at 172.
434
Id.
435
Id.
436
Id.
437
Id. at 175. Woodcock did note though that “many firms strive to exceed minimum manufacturing standards.” Id. at 172. Part of the difference may be driven by firm reputation. Other differences
may be driven by more straight economic factors. Branded sterile injectable manufacturers were twenty times as likely as generic sterile injectable manufacturers to reference a backup facility for drug
production when submitting an ANDA (20% vs. 1%). Id. at 174–75. Branded drugs have far higher
profit margins than generic drugs, such that the threat of lost sales is far more significant for branded
manufacturers than generic manufacturers; accordingly, higher investments in plant redundancy are
expected.
438
Id. at 175.
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scorecards for Health Management Organizations (“HMOs”) 439 or grades given
to restaurants by health inspectors. 440 They would demonstrate quality above that
required by cGMP regulations. 441 The FDA is currently planning to create a drug
quality program implemented by a newly instituted Office of Pharmaceutical
Quality within CDER. 442
Although this idea has significant potential, it might have limited effects on
manufacturing innovation. Even regulator-enforced quality grades might not be
transparent to the consumer. As in many aspects of healthcare, the question of
who exactly constitutes the market-oriented consumer is nontrivial. In retail settings, consumers might pay a premium for drugs with a prominent signal of
high-quality manufacturing and avoid those with a low-quality signal, changing
market incentives. Institutional purchasers (who dominate the market for many
drugs with the most prevalent manufacturing quality issues), however, may not
be concerned about minor differences in quality as long as the firm has met the
FDA’s marketability threshold. Because FDA certification provides a basic
quality guarantee, liability would be unlikely to result from failing to pay a premium for additional manufacturing quality. 443 This institutional lack of participation is especially likely to be true if quality metrics are not transparent to the final consumers. If patients, as now, are given drugs removed from their initial
packaging and dispensed through a hospital’s pharmacy system, the quality signals present in retail packaging would be absent at the time of use. Institutions
could therefore freely prioritize lower cost over paying a quality premium.
This approach could be modified to give greater industry incentives by leveraging the dynamic between brand and generic companies. If, in the drug approval process, a firm could commit to higher quality standards—say, a +/–1%
variation in active ingredient, rather than the typically permitted +/–10%—that
commitment could be added to the label and thus become enforceable by the
FDA. As a natural consequence, any firm seeking approval to market a generic
version of the drug would have to match that commitment and meet the same
439

Id. In California, the state provides quality ratings for health insurance plans, including
HMOs, as well as for health care providers. California Health Care Quality Report Cards, STATE
CAL., http://www.opa.ca.gov/Pages/ReportCard.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3RQA-HZ8M (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014).
440
See Restaurant Inspection Results (Letter Grades), N.Y. CITY DEPARTMENT HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/services/restaurant-inspection.shtml, archived at
http://perma.cc/87LH-3QLW (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
441
Technically, under FDA cGMP standards, any adulteration of a drug subjects the manufacturer
to enforcement. FDA-backed quality standards would therefore have to assume a baseline of fulfilling
cGMP regulations. Examples of quality criteria surpassing cGMP requirements might include additional rounds of sterilization, significantly lower active ingredient variability than the +/–10% range
typically permitted by the FDA, continuous process monitoring, or very high ingredient purity.
442
Hamburg, supra note 112.
443
As noted before, tort preemption is a particularly tangled doctrine at the moment and may
change. See supra note 348.
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quality standard. This would allow firms to erect a quality barrier to generic entry. Previous work has shown that fewer generics compete for hard-tomanufacture formulations. 444 This approach creates incentives for both branded
and generic manufacturers to increase manufacturing quality, without relying on
consumer or insurer preferences to generate those incentives. To limit generic
entry, branded-drug makers would need to invest in higher-quality manufacturing. And generic companies, to avoid exclusion from the market, would need to
invest as well. Consumers would receive higher quality drugs, both from the
brand company and from any compliant generics. This benefit would, of course,
need to be measured against potentially higher generic prices arising from decreased or delayed generic entry.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that studies of innovation policy in the pharmaceutical industry at the policy level and in academia have, until now, missed a crucial piece of the industry puzzle: the costs and complexities of pharmaceutical
manufacturing. This gap in theory, which this Article seeks to remedy, has had
major practical consequences. A combination of regulatory policy with several
barriers to manufacturing innovation and an intellectual property regime poorly
aligned to incentivize innovation results in tens to hundreds of billions of dollars
in lost social economic welfare, in addition to major human costs from drug
shortages and recalls.
This Article identifies as the principal cause of these problems a gap in innovation theory and policy in manufacturing processes, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry. New products must be made and distributed for society to
receive their benefit. Although society assumes that manufacturing and distribution are straightforward, the case of the pharmaceutical industry demonstrates
that this assumption is not always true. Profoundly problematic consequences
arise when regulations and incentives actively hinder manufacturing innovation.
Legal rules that work to drive innovative product development may not work for
manufacturing, and for drug manufacturing—a single example, but one of tremendous importance to the economy and to public health—those legal rules significantly slow innovation.
This policy gap regarding different forms of innovation, however, is amenable to new solutions in the form of regulatory shifts. Discovery and development of new drugs is a paradigm area where regulation is actively shaped to encourage innovation, and manufacturing those drugs is another area for regulation
to press forward. A parallel system of intellectual property incentives, or more
drastic changes that shift the way already existing incentives function in the in444
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 632–33 (2011).
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dustry, are two major possibilities. Other options may also be proposed once the
role of regulation in directly managing innovation is more fully appreciated.
Such approaches are not limited to the pharmaceutical industry, though they may
now be palatable or even conceivable only in that industry, given its unusually
heavily regulated nature. Thus, these methods suggest new ways of using regulatory levers for innovation in other contexts, especially substantively related industries with tight regulation, like medical devices or biomedical diagnostics.
There is an ongoing debate over the role of different intellectual property forms
in balancing initial innovation investments against restrictions on following innovation. In this context, the possibilities of altering which intellectual property
form dominates in a particular industry, or of using administrative forms to generate new innovation incentives, may have far-reaching implications.

